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I will examine Wittgenstein’s argument for the impossibility of a private language. The 
question, according to Wittgenstein, is this: is it logically possible for someone to use a 
language to refer to his inner experiences that only he can understand? There are three 
aspects of this question. The first is what the nature of a private language might be if it 
were possible. The second is how the nature of a private language bears on its logical 
possibility. The third is what implication the impossibility of a private language might 
have for other areas of philosophy.   
The first question is about the problem of logical incomprehensibility as it arises 
for both the putative private linguist and the putative hearer in a private language 
scenario. That is, what facts about a supposed private language logically constrain its 
comprehensibility to a would-be hearer, and its teachability by the would-be speaker? My 
answer to this question is that a private language is a language only its speaker can know 
to exist.    
The question of the impossibility of a private language, as I see it, is about the 
task of a putative private linguist, namely: what task is logically impossible for a private 
linguist to perform? There are two relevant interpretations of this question. The first is 
whether someone can use a language in private. The second is whether someone can 
invent (in the thesis, I use the word ‘invent’, interchangeably with ‘set up‘) a supposedly 
private language. Wittgenstein is usually interpreted to favour the second; the alternative 
language interpretation. But this thesis defends the first interpretation, which is about the 
 v
mode of use. That is, this thesis argues that it is logically impossible to use a language in 
private (i.e., use a private language).      
Lastly, how might the impossibility of a private language impact other areas of 
philosophy? This thesis contends that the impossibility of a private language throws light 
on the mind/body debate. It implies that a certain dualist thesis – dualism about sensation 




















ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN 
 
BT The Big Typescript, TS. 213 (2005)  
 
PI Philosophical Investigations (1953/2001), Reprinted in 2003.  
 
PO Philosophical occasions, 1912-1951 (1993) 
 
RPP Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980) 
OC On Certainty (1979)  
PR Philosophical Remarks (1975)  
 
PG Philosophical Grammar (1974)  
 
LPE ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”.’ (1968) 
 
Z Zettel (1967)  
 




References to works by Wittgenstein are given in the text by citing the initial letters of 
the titles followed by section or page numbers. Other works are referenced in the foot 






Chapter One: Introduction     
 
At §243 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises for discussion the 
question whether it is possible for there to be a language whose individual words refer to 
the sensations of its speaker, such that no one else but the speaker can understand it. His 
response to the question is that such a language is not possible. In the subsequent 
sections, Wittgenstein offers his argument for that claim. This is what philosophers refer 
to as the Private Language Argument (PLA).   
Presumably Wittgenstein does not ask whether a private language is possible just 
for the sake of answering that it is not. The question therefore arises what the overall goal 
of the PLA is supposed to be. Here opinions diverge. But that is not unexpected given 
that there is considerable disagreement even over what is meant by “private language”. 
This thesis is going to give an interpretation of a private language in order to argue, in 
agreement with Wittgenstein, that a private language (properly construed) is not possible. 
So much has been churned out in this respect in the literature that looking at it again, it 
appears, may be far from a much worthwhile venture. However, I am persuaded that the 
PLA is more consequential than the current literature suggests. My motivation is that 
there is a plausible connection between the PLA and a traditional debate in the 
philosophy of mind.   
This thesis argues that the private language argument is part of a larger effort to 
show that conscious experience is broadly physical in character. I argue that 
Wittgenstein’s arguments in sections 234-317 of the Philosophical Investigations support 
some form of materialism or physicalism. Thus, reflecting on the PLA seems to me to 
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provide an insight into the mind/body problem. The purpose of this thesis is to spell out 
this connection; i.e., lay out the PLA and the overall implications of the argument for the 
mind-body problem.   
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter Two addresses the first task of 
this thesis, which is to understand the nature of a private language. The question posed 
here is what a private language might look like if it were possible. It seems that 
interpreting the private language argument, namely, explaining why and how a private 
language is logically impossible, depends on whether and how we understand the nature 
of such a language. In other words, this chapter answers the prior question of the nature 
of a private language. The answer to this question builds on what Wittgenstein says about 
the language: a private language is a language only its speaker can understand, whose 
words describe the inner experiences of the speaker. This chapter argues that any 
language that satisfies these conditions is a language only its speaker can know to exist. 
That is, a language that a speaker uses to describe his inner experiences, but which 
someone else besides the speaker cannot understand, is a language that someone else 
besides the speaker cannot know to exist.   
 This seems to follow from the idea that possession of a private language is 
inconsistent with the conjunction of the following two possibilities: the possibility that 
someone distinct from me can have the evidence that I use a private language, and the 
possibility that I can have a public language.  If someone besides me can know that I use 
a private language, and I can have a public language, then it seems there is nothing 
stopping me from explaining the meaning of my supposedly private word to someone 
besides me, by using the public language that I can have to describe correlations between 
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what my private word refers to and the public evidence by which someone beside me can 
know that I use a private language. But the merit in this idea seems to depend on how it is 
defended against a possible objection that, though someone besides me might know that I 
use a language to refer to my sensations, the person cannot truly have a full 
understanding of the words with which I refer to those sensations. This is so, given that 
the person cannot have knowledge of the important features of the sensations that the 
words of my language refer to. This objection will be attended to.  
 Some philosophers believe that speaking a private language is inconsistent with 
speaking a public language.1 The last part of this chapter argues that possession of a 
private language is compatible with possession of a public language. It is logically 
possible for a private linguist to also speak a public language, provided that someone 
besides him cannot know that he has the private language.     
So far, the attempt to throw light on what the nature of a private language would 
be like if it were to exist is disciplined largely by what I think ought to follow from the 
two features of a private language identified by Wittgenstein. This is to avoid distracting 
the reader with exegetical matters. It therefore raises the question whether the nature of a 
private language that this thesis defends is supported by the text. Chapter Three brings to 
the fore a discussion of the relevant passages – to the idea of the nature of a private 
language set out in Chapter Two – from the Philosophical Investigations by engaging 
some scholars on the interpretations of those relevant passages.   
Chapter Four focuses on the interpretation of the private language argument itself, 
which is to show why and how the language is impossible. Literally speaking, this 
question seems to be mainly about a hypothetical language. But upon closer examination, 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Dorit Bar-On, “On the Possibility of a Solitary Language,” Nous 26, 1 (1992) 
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it seems that we can pose a similar question about a putative user of the language with its 
meaning intact. We can ask, for instance, whether it is possible for someone to have or 
use a private language. In that event, the question whether a private language is possible 
can be rephrased in the following way: whether a putative private linguist can accomplish 
his task. But the question is what the task of a putative private linguist is. This chapter 
discusses two possible conceptions. I will argue, in agreement with Wittgenstein, that the 
private linguist faces the task of using a language in private. Wittgenstein is often 
interpreted as holding that the private linguist faces the task of setting up the language.  
I will argue that a language only its speaker can know to exist is impossible given 
that the speaker cannot use the language to say anything to himself. That is, the person 
cannot use the language to make different kinds of speech acts. The chapter also 
discusses alternative interpretations of the task of a private linguist.   
Chapter Five is where the overall implication of the impossibility of a private 
language is argued. The chapter connects the impossibility of a private language to the 
mind/body debate; i.e., it argues that phenomenal consciousness is physical. It begins 
with an argument to the conclusion that conscious states are physical. In that argument, 
the impossibility of a private language is then used as a counter-objection to a dualist 
attack against physicalism. However, the goal in this chapter is not only to establish a 
connection between the impossibility of a private language and the idea that conscious 
states are physical; but also to attribute that view about the nature of states of 
consciousness to Wittgenstein. This requires doing at least two things. The first one is to 
show that Wittgenstein is aware of and is interested in the mind/body debate as it is 
presently understood. The second is to provide textual justification for attributing the 
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argument – for the physical nature of conscious states – to Wittgenstein, or at least 
evidence that might make it plausible that something like that argument is not totally 
foreign to his thinking. The chapter ends with a discussion of some alternative 
interpretations of the importance of the impossibility of a private language.  

























The first task of this inquiry is to understand what exactly the nature of a private language 
is. In this chapter, I do not intend to discuss the private language argument itself, but to 
step back from it to ask: What is a ‘private language’? My answer to this question is 
based primarily on Wittgenstein’s remarks in §243-§317 of the Philosophical 
Investigations.  
There are two main features of a private language, as Wittgenstein understands it. 
The first is that only the person speaking the language can understand it. The second is 
that the language describes the inner experiences (Wittgenstein uses the words, inner 
experiences, interchangeably with ‘sensations’, such as, pain and colour experiences) of 
its speaker. I discuss these features in three sections. In section I, I argue that a 
hypothetical private language, i.e., a language whose words refer to the inner experiences 
of its speaker and only its speaker can possibly comprehend, is either the only language 
its speaker can possibly have, or else a language only the speaker can know to exist. In 
section II, I discuss an important objection to the argument I give in section I. In section 
III, I argue for a stronger claim that results from knocking off the first disjunct of the 
claim introduced in section I and defended in II. The stronger claim is that only the 
speaker of a private language can possibly know that the language exists.   
 6
I. A language whose words only its speaker can possibly understand 
 
Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a private language as follows: 
 
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give 
vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for 
his private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not 
what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only 
be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another 
person cannot understand the language. (PI §243) 
 
Here Wittgenstein describes a private language as one that has the following features: (a) 
only the person speaking the language can understand it, and (b) the language describes 
the inner experiences of the speaker.  
Wittgenstein’s question does not concern our ordinary talk of sensations—at least, 
not in the first instance. For Wittgenstein, the viability of a public language of sensation 
is not in question; ordinarily, we use words to refer to sensations in a way that other 
people are capable of understanding. (PI §244) Rather, he is asking whether it is possible 
to use words to refer to inner experience that have no connections whatsoever with the 
speaker’s sensation-behaviour (PI §256), in such a way that the words are 
comprehensible to no one besides the person who uses them.  
I maintain that any language that satisfies these conditions is either the only 
language the speaker can possibly have, or else a language only its speaker can possibly 
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know to exist. In what follows, I defend this conditional by arguing that for any 
individual speaker and any language, L, these three statements are inconsistent:  
  
(A) The speaker can have a public language.   
(B) There is a language, L, that only the speaker can understand. 
(C) Someone besides the speaker can know that L exists.  
 
I will quickly run through the basic idea. If (A) and (B) are true, then the speaker can use 
his public language to tell another person what the meaning of the words of his 
supposedly private language are, by describing correlations between what those words 
stand for and various public events, unless there are no public events correlated with the 
meanings of the private words (or, with the speaker’s use of the words to refer to his 
sensations). That is, if (A) and (B) are true, (C) is false.  Similarly, if (A) and (C) are true, 
then there is nothing to prevent the speaker from telling someone else what the 
supposedly private words of L refer to, by using his public language to describe 
correlations between the sensations he uses these words to refer to and the public events 
by which another person can know of the existence of L; i.e., so (B) must be false. 
Finally, if (B) and (C) are true, then the only thing that could prevent the speaker from 
being able to explain the meanings of the words of L to another person would be the 
speaker’s inability to use a public language to specify the relevant correlations; i.e., by A 
being false.    
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Now any of the implications is enough to establish the inconsistency of {A, B, C}. 
But I use the second implication, from (A & C) to ~ B, to spell out the details. The 
inconsistency of (A) and (C) with (B) arises as follows:  
 
1. If (C) is true, then someone distinct from the speaker, the audience, can have 
public evidence pertaining to the speaker that tells the audience that L exists. 
 
2. If (A) is true, then the speaker can use a public language to explain to the 
audience what the words of L mean, if the audience can have public evidence 
pertaining to the speaker that tells the audience that L exists. 
 
3.  If the speaker can explain to the audience what the words of L mean, then (B) is 
false.   
 
If (C) is true, then someone distinct from the speaker, the audience, can have public 
evidence pertaining to the speaker that tells the audience that L exists. The point here is 
not that the audience must possess this or that specific form of public evidence, but only 
that she must have some public evidence. We need not suppose that the speaker of L 
makes frantic gesticulations, nor that he points to physical objects like tables, birds, and 
the like as he uses the language. Nonetheless, if the audience is going to know that the 
speaker uses a language, the audience must have some evidence of its existence. This 
evidence must relate somehow to features of the speaker that the audience can perceive, 
and must therefore be public.  
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   If (A) is true, then the speaker can use a public language to explain to the audience 
what the words of L mean, if the audience can have public evidence pertaining to the 
speaker that tells the audience that L exists. The question now is whether the speaker can 
use the same evidence to let the audience know what the words of L are about. I believe 
this is theoretically possible, if we grant both the speaker and the audience a shared 
public language. Suppose the speaker has a sensation, and he says in the words of L, “I 
have a so-and-so sensation” which, supposedly, the audience cannot understand. Suppose 
the audience knows a language is being used by observing some correlating public 
features of the speaker. The speaker can then use his public language to explain the words 
of L by focusing on the public correlates of the sensation. He is able to tell the audience: 
“By such-and-such words of L, I mean the sensation I am experiencing when such-and-
such public events occur”. One can imagine the sensation the speaker focuses on to elicit 
in him the expression “I am having sensation S.” And also imagine that each time he says 
this to himself, his blood pressure increases. (PI §270) the speaker can then use the 
physiological events to tell the audience the meaning of the words of L: “By ‘S’ I mean 
the sensation I have when my blood pressure increases.”       
But suppose the speaker is not aware of these correlations? One may agree that 
the speaker is of course aware of his uses of L; but deny that he is aware of their public 
correlates. He is unaware of the public events that occur as he uses L. But could he not 
know about them? If another person could observe those features, then they could be 
brought to his notice also. It seems impossible that someone could have information 
about my public features that I cannot possibly have: if he could know about them, he 
could then explain them to anyone with whom he shared a language, including me.   
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Suppose again S is a sensation the speaker does not possess enough public 
linguistic resources to explain. I imagine here that the speaker’s competence in a public 
language is limited. Though there might be appropriate public words to describe the 
sensation, the speaker simply has no grasp of such words. Now, let us imagine that the 
sensation the speaker has is what in the English language is referred to as ‘migraine’. It is 
possible that the speaker has never heard of the word ‘migraine,’ or he has not associated 
it yet with the sensations the word refers to. But the fact remains that it is logically 
possible for the speaker to have the requisite competence in the public language, and 
therefore possible for him to describe to the audience the correlations between his use of 
‘S’ and its public correlates.  
 
If the speaker can explain to the audience what the words of L mean, then (B) is false. If 
for every word of L, the audience knows how to specify exactly what that word stands 
for, then she understands L. There is at least a theoretical possibility that someone (apart 
from the person who uses the language) can understand the language even if a particular 
individual is unable to understand it (perhaps for lack of intelligence).  
Someone may object that such an understanding would be incomplete. He might 
argue that all that has been shown so far is that someone distinct from the speaker might 
be able to specify public evidence that correlates with the speaker’s use of the private 
word but not what the word of L actually refers to. The objector might insist: the 
audience would know something, but not everything – and not, perhaps, the most 
interesting or important thing – about what the speaker’s word refers to. Thus, she is yet 
to understand, in the robust sense, the meaning of his private word. This objection might 
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be inspired by Russell’s distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by 
acquaintance.2 The observer may be able to gain a descriptive understanding of L, but a 
full understanding requires that she has acquaintance with the other’s inner experience. 
This is to say that I can have a complete understanding of the proposition “X is in pain” 
only if I am acquainted, not with my pain, but X’s pain.  
Perhaps this is asking too much. If acquaintance with a word’s referent is 
necessary for a full understanding of the word, we could not have a full understanding of 
words like “yesterday” and (when uttered by someone else) “I”. Similarly, we could not 
fully understand words referring to events before our birth or after our death, since we 
cannot possibly have acquaintance with these events. Yet, we do take ourselves to have 
full understanding of these words.  
Still there does seem to be something to the critic’s complaint that merely being 
able to pick out the referents of a sensation word by means of a suitable definite 
description, such as “the sensation I have when my blood pressure spikes,” is not enough 








                                                 
2 Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” in Propositions and 
Attitudes, eds. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988), 16-32.  
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II.   A language whose words refer to the inner experiences of its speaker 
 
I argued in the previous section that: if a language, L, can be understood only by its 
speaker, then either its speaker is unable to use any public language, or else no one 
besides L’s speaker can know L exists. I argued that someone besides the speaker of L 
can understand the words of L, given that the speaker of L can use a public language to 
describe the sensation that the words of L refer to as those which he has when he uses 
those words. But someone might object that such an understanding is only superficial. As 
the objection goes, the audience might have a descriptive understanding of the speaker’s 
private word for his sensation but would nonetheless be far from having a full 
understanding of that word since she cannot be directly acquainted with the speaker’s 
sensation.  
 At the end of the previous section, I argued that: if we hold direct accessibility to 
the speaker’s sensation to be necessary for a full understanding of the speaker’s private 
words, we are forced to the absurd conclusion that no two persons can understand even a 
public language, since a considerable part of our public language is about referents with 
which we have limited or no direct acquaintance. One might grant that we have a sort of 
direct acquaintance with events that happen at present and are able to fully understand 
propositions about such events. But can we say the same for propositions about the 
events that happened in the past, long before our birth; or about the events that will 
happen in the future, long after we are dead? More directly, can we claim to fully 
understand propositions about our history and culture, or about the evolution and the 
future of humanity or the planet Earth itself, or even about dinosaurs and any other 
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creatures extinct long before humankind evolved? Not if direct accessibility is necessary 
for understanding. But we rightly take ourselves to fully understand claims about such 
things notwithstanding our lack of direct acquaintance with them.   
The objection, I suggest, is rather an occasion for us to examine more closely the 
nature of the sensations that the words of a private language supposedly refer to. Are 
those sensations supposed to be unique to the individual that has them? That is, are they 
supposed to be sensations of a kind or quality that only the private linguist possesses? 
And if so, is this supposed to be a necessary or merely contingent fact about them? That 
is, is it supposed to be not just true, but necessarily true that the private linguist is the 
only being who has sensations of the sort that he refers to in private?     
In what follows, I argue that there are two relevant possibilities, here. The first, 
discussed in section II.1, is that the private linguist’s sensations are of a kind that other 
people have, or at least could have. I argue that in this case, it is possible for the sensation 
to acquire a public name, since it is then logically possible for a whole community of 
people to have a sensation of that kind. The second possibility, discussed in II.2, is that 
the private linguist’s sensations are of a sort that only he could possibly have. I argue that 








II. 1 First possibility: the private linguist’s sensations are not necessarily unique 
 
If the private linguist’s sensations are not necessarily unique, it follows that someone 
else, and indeed a whole community of people, could have sensations of the same kind. 
What I wish to argue now is that if a sensation is of a kind that more than one person can 
have, then it is at least logically possible for there to be a public-language word for it. By 
saying that there is a public-language word for a sensation, X, I mean that there is a word 
that (1) multiple people use to refer to X, and, (2) multiple people have a ‘full’ (rather 
than superficial) understanding of what other people mean by the word. 
Here, then, is my argument:  
 
1. If sensation X is of a kind multiple people can have, then there can be a word 
that multiple people can use to refer to X. 
  
2. If there can be a word that multiple can use to refer to X, then multiple people 
can have a full understanding of the meaning of a public word for X. 
 
3. So, if sensation X is of a kind multiple people can have, then multiple people 
can have a full understanding of the meaning of a public word for X.       
 
I now attend to the two premises.  
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If sensation X is of a kind multiple people can have, then there can be a word that 
multiple people can use to refer to X: Let us suppose that the private linguist possesses a 
kind of sensation only he happens to have but that it would be possible for other people to 
have as well. Here Jackson’s example of Fred readily comes to mind. Fred is able to 
make colour discrimination between items, which appear to us to be the same colour. Put 
to the test, Fred sorts items we consider to be the same colour into two “colours”. Given a 
batch of red tomatoes, he separates them further into red1 and red2 batches. He does this 
with as much consistency as we separate yellow objects from blue ones. Nevertheless, 
Fred is not able to share with us the ‘feel’ of his colour experiences. Based on the 
consistency with which he sorts out the items, we are able to see (in the metaphorical 
sense of the word, see) that there is something about Fred’s colour spectrum, which is 
different from ours, even though we are unable to experience colour in quite the way Fred 
does.3  
For our purposes in this thesis, I “admit that Fred can see, really see, at least one 
more colour than we can; red1 is different from red2.”4 I grant also that Fred is unable to 
describe his sensation to anyone else: “He only uses the common term ‘red’ to fit more 
easily into our restricted usage.”5 When Fred uses his word for red1 we are unable to 
grasp what exactly the word refers to. Jackson asks us to imagine “that he has often tried 
                                                 
3 Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32, no.127 (1982): 128-30. I will skip a 
few other details about Fred’s colour profile which supposedly entitles Jackson to draw the conclusion that 
physicalism is false. Jackson has recently changed his views. See his “Postscript on Qualia”, in There’s 
something about Mary: essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, 
edited by Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2004), 417-9; 
see also his “Mind and Illusion”, ibid., 421-39.  
 
4 Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” 129.  
 
5 Ibid., 128.  
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to teach the difference between red1 and red2 to his friends but has got nowhere and has 
concluded that the rest of the world is red1-red2 colour-blind”.6 The truth is: we are far 
from understanding his words ‘red1’ and ‘red2’.  
But does it follow that Fred’s word for ‘red2’ is part of a private language? Even 
though in fact Fred is the only person who has red1 and red2 experiences, we are 
supposing that this is only a contingent fact; other people could have the same kind of 
visual experience that Fred has, even though they do not in fact have experience of that 
kind. (Jackson suggests that doctors might discover an operation that would allow us to 
see things the way Fred does.) But then it seems there can be a public-language word for 
red2, just as there is a public-language word ‘red’ that refers to the sensation that most of 
us actually have when viewing ripe tomatoes. Red2 can acquire a public-language name 
in a way similar to that in which our ordinary word ‘red’ refers to our ordinary experience 
of red. Recall that what is in question here is not how a word can possibly refer to (or 
name) a sensation but the actual possibility of a word to refer to sensation X. However, 
the position I defend is not merely the possibility of a word to refer to sensation X. That 
is, not only could a community of people use the same word ‘red’ to refer to their 
conscious experiences, but also they could fully comprehend the meaning of the word. I 
now attend to the stronger part of that claim.   
 
If sensation X is of a kind multiple people can have, and there can be a word that 
multiple people can use to refer to X, then multiple people can have a full understanding 
of the meaning of a public word for X. Our day-to-day dealings with other people are 
evidence that we believe that our conscious experiences are similar to theirs. Experience 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 128-9.  
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teaches that touching a fire with bare hands hurts. No one doubts a child’s experience of 
touching the naked flame of a burning candle. We believe the child experiences a 
sensation similar to ours. We do not suppose the child’s cry on touching the fire 
corresponds to anything but a pain sensation. (Cf. PI §249) Thus, given the way we 
behave, it is evident that we take ourselves to be justified in believing that we know the 
phenomenal quality of other people’s sensations. Otherwise, our attitudes and behaviour 
would not be what they are.  
At least two points are discernible in the above paragraph: (i) that we do believe 
other people have phenomenal experiences of a certain quality; and (ii) that we are 
justified in believing this. We do not take seriously anyone who suggests that (i) is false; 
we simply show him that his day-to-day relationship with other human beings is not 
consistent with any such doubts on his part. Simply put: “If I see someone writhing in 
pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.” (PI 
§190)  
But it seems (ii) does not have as much force as (i), though it is compelling in the 
case of certain phenomenal experiences that have strong and distinct correlating public 
features, such as pain and pleasure. One might argue, for instance, that it is possible for 
someone else to have different pain sensations from one’s own. Perhaps the cutting-pain 
and the burning-pain I experience when I cut my finger and touch a naked flame, 
respectively, are inverted in others’ phenomenology.  
Someone who wants to deny (ii) might be even more sceptical about colour 
experiences. He might deny, for instance, that he has any good reason to believe that 
other people have phenomenal experiences similar to his own when they perceive the 
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same colour samples as him. It appears that one’s behaviour towards other people would 
not change in any significant way if one believed them to have colour sensations of a type 
radically different from one’s own.  
Instead of trying to unearth a natural and deep-rooted commitment on our parts to 
the claim that other peoples’ colour experience is by and large similar to our own, I shall 
offer a more direct argument. Specifically, I argue that the idea of the inversion of any of 
our phenomenal experiences is, at least, naturally untenable.  
Take my experience for example: each time my body is in a certain state, it is 
accompanied by a certain sensation. A certain bodily state of mine is correlated with a 
certain phenomenal state. Touching a hot-plate, for instance, is correlated with a burning 
experience. And, when I focus on a colour patch, I experience the relevant colour-
sensation, i.e., blue as blue; red as red, and suchlike. Likewise for other kinds of 
phenomena qualities: each is at least contingently correlated with a corresponding state of 
my body. This leads me to believe that other people have similar phenomenal experiences 
when they are in the same bodily states as me.  
The question is what justification I have for holding that belief. In what follows, I 
argue this claim in two different ways: first by an inductive inference, and then by an 
abductive inference.    
 
The inductive inference  
 
Ordinarily, I make inferences to the quality of other people’s phenomenal experience on 
the basis of the quality of my own experience. This is a kind of inference we make all the 
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time, from what we directly observe to things that lie at a cognitive distance from us. Call 
it inductive inference. Many, if not most, of the decisions we make and the beliefs we 
hold are based on induction.  
Although our day-to-day life is structured largely on the principle of induction, it 
is not my purpose here to defend inductive reasoning as a whole, that so-and-so are 
sufficient conditions for something counting as a good inductive inference. I am simply 
assuming that there are such things as good inductive inferences. My claim is that a 
particular inference that I am interested in is a good inductive inference.  
Consider an ordinary case of inductive reasoning: One might infer, for instance, 
that (a) car y in North America, will have a defective brakes system, from the fact that, 
(b) car x, in West Africa, was recently discovered to have a defective brakes system.  
Without further qualification, this inference is weak. It seems unreasonable to 
base a judgement about the condition of car y on this information about the condition of 
car x, for reasons that might include differences in maintenance, road conditions, and so 
on, between the different cars and their environments. But suppose we can trace the 
origin of the malfunctioning units in car x and car y to the same origin, e.g., both cars are 
manufactured in the same factory, where their brakes systems were produced from the 
same blocks. Here, we find a tighter relationship between the sample on which the 
inference is based, car x, and the inference that one intends to draw. And it does not seem 
to matter that the inference is based on a single case—a sample consisting of just one car.   
In order to make the moral of the foregoing discussion bear on the case of the 
inference to the quality of other people’s phenomenal states, it is important to elucidate 
the nature of the relationship between the sample and the conclusion drawn in the case 
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above. As earlier stated, we have a case of two distinct entities, car x and car y. We have 
ample information about the one in respect of its functional status; but cognitively, we are 
at a distance from the other. What allows us to make this inference from the condition of 
car x to the condition of car y is our knowledge that the two cars have a common origin. 
There is an explanatory connection between car x and car y, and it is this connection that 
makes it reasonable to infer (a) from (b).    
We find ourselves in a similar situation in the case of phenomenal consciousness. 
Am I justified in believing that other people have a certain quality of sensation, based on 
observation of my own conscious experiences? The answer depends on how the observed 
correlation between our bodily states and phenomenal states stands in relation to others’ 
phenomenal states. My view is that one can be as justified in the case of the inference to 
the quality of others’ phenomenal experience from the observed correlation between 
one’s bodily states and phenomenal states as one is in the previous case, from car x to car 
y.   
Consider by way of analogy the following inference:  
 
(c) Certain bodily states of mine correlate with sensations of a certain phenomenal 
quality, 
therefore, 
 (d) Other people have phenomenal experience of the same quality if they are in the         
same bodily state as I. 
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It is reasonable to infer (d) from (c) on the model of the inference from (b) to (a). Of 
course, the nature of the sample and the entity that the general claim is about in the 
previous case is different from what is involved in the present case. In the one case, we 
have ordinary physical objects, cars; but in the other, we have phenomenal states. 
However, since our concern is not about the entities per se, but about the nature of the 
inference, we can say that both cases are similar in the relevant respect, i.e., in the kind of 
inference drawn. Also, it is no objection that one is extrapolating the quality of others’ 
phenomenal experience from a single case. For one thing, the sample is large. I have 
witnessed on countless occasions the correlation between certain states of my body and 
certain states of my consciousness. But perhaps the objection is that a single person’s 
mind is an inadequate sample from which to infer the quality of the sensations of other 
minds. But, as we have seen in the previous case – of car x and car y – the size of the 
sample is irrelevant. It is not the size of the sample that matters, but the relationship 
between the sample from which we are inferring and the population about which we are 
trying to draw a conclusion. Thus the fact that there is only one mind, my own, of which I 
have direct evidence, is no bar to the acceptability of the inductive inference.          
The pertinent question then is what it is about me that makes me have pain when I 
stub my toe, or experience a bluish sensation when I see the sky. Is there something that 
can play a role similar to that of the brake moulds in the car example?  It seems there is, 
namely: something about me that I inherited from my parents—an inherited characteristic 
passed down from one generation to another, to my parents from theirs, and from my 
parents to me. The biological relationship between my parents and myself, and between 
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theirs and the generations before them explains the fact that certain psycho-physical 
correlations occur in me.  
Both myself and other beings like me are of common ancestry. We all evolved as 
a single species of humankind. This does not imply that phenomenal states are selected 
for directly. As far as the central claim here goes, it may well be the case that 
phenomenal states are mere by-products of selected traits.7 The mechanical fault in car x 
may not result directly from the defective brake blocks – the defect is not literally a 
component assembled along with the brake system – but it does result from the way the 
brake system interacts with the rest of the car, which in turn results from the way the 
block produced the brakes. Similarly, the quality of my phenomenal experience may be a 
side-effect of some physical traits that I inherited from my parents, even if that quality is 
not something I directly inherited from them.  
There is a ‘cause and effect’ aspect to this argument. The brake system causes the 
relevant mechanical malfunction in the car; and likewise, the physical states cause the 
qualities of my phenomenology. Similar cause, similar effect. Given that the brakes 
systems of car x and car y are of a common origin, and that the mechanical fault in car x 
is caused by one of the brakes systems in car x, it is reasonable to infer that the system in 
car y will cause a similar mechanical fault. Similar blokes will produce similar brake 
systems, and similar brakes systems will cause similar mechanical faults. In the same 
way, given that two conscious systems are of common ancestry, and that the physical 
changes in one cause certain qualities of phenomenal experience, we can reasonably infer 
that similar physical changes in the other conscious system will cause similar qualities of 
                                                 
7 Frank Jackson, ibid., 134.  
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phenomenal experience. Identical physical changes (in any two conscious systems) will 
cause identical phenomenal experiences (in them).   
Thus, given the evolutionary connection between myself and other beings like 
me, it is reasonable to believe that the experiencing of certain phenomenal states that 
correlate with certain bodily states will hold for them as it holds for me.   
 
The abductive inference 
 
It is possible to argue the same conclusion through a different and perhaps simpler route. 
The claim again is that we are justified in believing that other people have a certain 
quality of experience. The argument I have in mind is what might be called an 
‘abductive’ inference, i.e., an inference from certain basic facts to the best explanation of 
these facts. The argument is 1) that there is some underlying explanation of the fact that I 
have certain forms of experience when subjected to certain stimuli; 2) that the simplest 
explanation of this fact goes by something like the principle of organizational 
invariance8; and, 3) that the simplest explanation of something is one we are justified in 
believing; so that, 4) we are justified in believing something like the principle of 
organizational invariance; in which case, 5) I am justified in believing that other people 
have phenomenal experiences similar to mine.   
I have certain forms of experience when subjected to certain stimuli. For instance, 
putting my hands in a fire correlates with having a burning sensation, and seeing the sky 
correlates with having a bluish sensation. As mentioned earlier, I have observed the 
                                                 
8 The expression is due to David Chalmers, see The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), especially, 247-9.  
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correlation often enough that the possibility of the correlation being an accident is ruled 
out. Thus, there must be some underlying explanation of the psycho-physical correlations 
that I observe in myself. The question is what might be the best explanation of the 
correlation. 
The simplest explanation will be one that is capable of explaining similar 
occurrences in other beings that are in relevant respects like me. It will be a law-like 
explanation. Such a general law might read: Any conscious being whose brain functions 
as mine at a certain neural level will have experiences like the ones I have. This is what 
Chalmers calls the law (or principle) of organisational invariance: 
 
[G]iven any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the 
same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical 
experiences. According to this principle, consciousness is an organizational 
invariant: a property that remains constant over all functional isomorphs of a 
given system.9 
 
Someone might deny that the best and simplest explanation of one’s own 
psychophysical features goes by way of something like the principle of organizational 
invariance. But the burden of proof lies on the would-be critic to provide a better and 
simpler explanation. It is hard to see what such an explanation would look like. Until and 
unless a better explanation is proposed the inductive inference to the quality of other 
peoples’ conscious experience stands as a reasonable one. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 249.  
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Recall that the overall argument in section I is that if somebody besides me can 
know that I use a language, L, to refer to my sensation, then it is possible for him to have 
a full understanding of the words of L that I use to refer to those sensations. The purpose 
of II.1 was to show that this is true, as long as my sensations are of a kind that other 
people could have. The purpose of II.2 will be to show that my sensations must be of 
such a kind.    
But what of a kind of sensation no one else can possibly have? Note that the 
position I have defended so far rested on the proposition: sensation X is of a type multiple 
people can have, but whose truth I have simply assumed. Yet nothing stops the opponent 
from making a volte-face about the nature of sensation X. The person might argue that 
sensation X is of a kind no two people can share. I attend to this objection immediately.  
 
II.2 Second possibility: the private linguist’s sensations are necessarily unique 
 
I argue that this is not really a possibility at all; that there cannot be a kind of sensation 
such that, as a matter of logical necessity, only one person can have sensations of that 
kind. More specifically, I argue that it is neither possible nor even conceivable for there 
to be a kind of sensation such that it is logically impossible for there to be a linguistic 
community all of whose members have sensations of that kind.  
Take a particular conscious experience, pain, for instance. One might claim that 
the nature of a person’s experience of pain at any given time depends on the totality of 
his pain-history; more generally, one might claim that the history of a person’s 
phenomenology fixes the feel of her current phenomenal experience. On this view, if I 
 26
happen to stub my toe, the feel of the pain I experience in that instance is partly a 
function of my previous phenomenal states. If the toe I stubbed, for example, is sore from 
a recent similar incident, it is reasonable to expect the feel of my pain to be qualitatively 
different from anyone else’s. It might be argued that the history of every phenomenal 
experience puts a distinctive mark to the feel of that experience. In a similar thought 
experiment, Moser asserts, 
 
We can imagine a case where one’s sensations cannot be shared by anyone else. 
Such unsharability could be due, for instance, to a kind of sensation holism: a 
sensation is what it is because of its causal inter-relations to all one’s other 
sensations. We might even imagine a case where the sorts of sensations one has 
are essentially peculiar to oneself, because of sensation-sort holism.10  
 
In light of these remarks, one might argue that a sensation exists within a holistic pattern 
of (causally) related sensations. Any one sensation is what it is – has the quality it has – 
in virtue of the pattern within which it occurs. A person’s sensations might therefore be 
private in the sense that they have a phenomenal quality unique to sensations that occur 
in that person’s overall pattern or history of sensations.  
However, it is possible to imagine a world where there is, for every history of 
phenomenology, an identical case. In such a world, which may as well be ours, any two 
individuals with shared histories of phenomenology will necessarily have qualitatively 
identical current conscious states, if it is true, as the critic posits, that the history of 
                                                 
10 Paul Moser, “Beyond the Private Language Problem,” Metaphilosophy 23, no. 1 & 2 (1992):  85. 
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phenomenology determines the nature of a current phenomenal experience. Suppose two 
persons, X and Y have identical phenomenal histories; if they both stub the same 
(corresponding) toes, against similar objects and with the same amount of force, then the 
quality of their pain-experience will be identical.  
Moreover, even an advocate of sensation-sort holism should probably grant that  
minor differences need not make people’s phenomenology so different from one another 
as to prevent as good an understanding of each other’s sensation words as they have of 
each other’s words for ordinary physical things.11 If we ask a couple of individuals to 
describe what they mean by the English word ‘cat’, their descriptions would overlap 
substantially. There is nothing to suggest that a similar scenario cannot obtain in the case 




I have shown that the idea of a ‘private’ sensation, in any of its possible interpretations, 
when pursued to its logical conclusion, collapses as a plausible objection to the 
possibility of understanding, in a robust sense, a word that the speaker of a language, L, 
uses to refer to one of his sensations, given that the speaker can use a public language to 
describe the correlation between his sensation and the public evidence the audience has 
                                                 
11 This, however, does not apply to the private linguist, as Moser appears to suggest. That is, if there were a 
private language, identical histories of phenomenology or type-identical sensations as he calls it, would in 
no way facilitate “interpersonal communication” between its supposed users. I am astounded at the 
suggestion that a private linguist—someone who supposedly speaks a language no else can possibly 
understand—can communicate with other person(s) who are in the same condition. It would be interesting 
to know how else Moser understands a private language, i.e., if the supposed private linguists can 
communicate with each other, in what sense then are they using a private language? But whatever that 
understanding might consist, in event of interpersonal communication amongst hypothetical private 
linguists, we would have no more reason to believe they speak a private language than we have that the 
language they use is actually a public one.     
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for believing that the speaker’s word for the sensation is used. But nothing I have said so 
far presupposes the possibility or impossibility of a private language. Rather, it clarifies 
the nature of a hypothetical private language, defined as a language whose speaker uses 
to describe his sensations, and whose speaker alone can possibly understand. We have 
found that possession of a private language is either incompatible with possession of a 
public language, or is known to exist by no one else but its speaker. In the next section, I 
argue for a stronger claim: that if there is such a thing as a private language, it is a 

















III.  A language only its speaker can possibly know to exist 
 
So far, I have argued that if a private language is possible, at least one of two claims must 
be true. Either its speaker cannot have a public language, or no one other than its speaker 
can know the language exists. In other words, the proponent of a private language is 
committed to at least one of the following two claims:  
 
A. If there is a private language, then its speaker cannot have a public language.  
Or, 
B. If there is a private language, then no one other than its speaker can know it 
exists.12 
 
In this section, I argue that (A.) is not a viable option. If correct, this means that the idea 
of a private language is, among other things, the idea of a language that cannot be known 
to exist to anyone but its speaker. One way of substantiating this stronger claim is to 
show that there is at least a scenario in which possession of a public language is 
compatible with possession of a private language.   
Here I take a roughly Socratic approach, engaging an imaginary proponent of a 
private language. I pose a few questions to my opponent, provide what I consider to be 
his best responses, and then assess the possible implications of such responses. 
                                                 
12 Cf. the discussion on the incompatibility of (A), (B), & (C): “the speaker can have a public language”, 
“There is a language, L, that only the speaker can understand”, and “Someone besides the speaker can 
know that L exists”, respectively, in Section I.   
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Wittgenstein, I believe, favours this approach, as he himself engages a potential 
proponent of a private language as he discusses the private language problem.  
Let us now consider the following, admittedly rather weird, conversation: 
 
Q1:  “Do you believe that a private language is possible?”   
Ans. 1:  “Yes” 
Q2:   “And do you take yourself to use one?”   
Ans. 2:  “Yes” 
Q3:  “Do you also acknowledge that you have a public language?”  
Ans. 3:  “Yes”  
 
Although this is not a very inspiring dialogue, considering it in detail reveals the 
difficulties involved in opting for (A.) above.  
 
“Do you believe that a private language is possible?” If you believe a private language is 
possible, you must answer “Yes” to this question, if you answer it all. Yet someone may 
suppose a non-response to be an option. I do not. Perhaps the only scenario in which that 
may happen is if I am addressing a committee of cats, which is far from being the case. I 
take it that I am addressing this important question to a reasonable person! Now, my 
interlocutor could answer “No”. But then he would be on my side. And in that case, I 
should have to carry on with my project. Otherwise, he must say “Yes” and trigger a 
disagreement. The question is what the implication of a “Yes” would be.  
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“Do you take yourself to use one?” My interlocutor can answer “Yes” or “No”, but the 
only rational answer is a “Yes”! The only reason anyone can have for believing that a 
private language is possible is that he thinks he has one. I argue for this as follows.   
Suppose the interlocutor says “No”. He believes strictly that it is possible that 
someone can speak a private language but is uncommitted to the idea that he or anyone 
else does speak one. (PI §294) How then could he get the idea that a private language is 
possible unless he takes himself to speak one? Well, how do you normally go about 
defending an assertion that something is possible if there are not actual examples? In a 
sense, I could defend the assertion that it is possible for objects to fly in spite of the pull 
of gravity. I only need to point out airplanes, for instance. Yet, one could explain the 
mechanics of a flying saucer even though there are no manned prototypes for now, just as 
it was possible to describe airplanes before they became a reality. 
However, unlike airplanes and flying saucers, there are other possibilities of 
which there are not only no actual examples, but of which there cannot now possibly be 
any actual examples. History, for example, could have presented us with different events. 
But there is no way one could have actual examples of these events having been different. 
Nonetheless, we still can defend the idea that historical events could have been different, 
because we can clearly conceive of actual past events having failed to occur in favour of 
alternative, counterfactual events. Given that there is no good argument against the 
possibility of things having happened differently, this gives us a good reason to believe 
they could have. Consider World War I, 1914-1919, for instance. It is impossible for us 
to have actual cases of different events occurring during this period. However, it is 
conceivable that different events could have occurred, or that some or all of those events 
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(which precipitated the war) did not occur and the war was avoided, i.e., a scenario in 
which Austria did not annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, or in which the emperor’s 
nephew was not assassinated in Sarajevo in June 1914, or in which Austria-Hungary did 
not declare war on Serbia, or in which the international community did not take sides.      
Suppose I ask my interlocutor to clearly describe a situation in which a private 
language is spoken. Since he doesn’t take there to be any actual examples of a private 
language, he must base his judgement that it is possible on his ability to conceive of one. 
But if he can conceive of it, then he should be able to describe it. In the event that the 
opponent declines to offer any such description, we are left with no reason to believe that 
he really thinks a private language is conceivable or possible.  
Suppose we try to describe a purely hypothetical situation in which someone 
speaks a private language. The speaker, N, for instance, has a conscious experience of 
pain. And he is able to form the belief: “I am in pain!” But the belief has no physiological 
ramifications. It would therefore be possible that although he feels pain, N talks or acts 
like he believes he is not in pain. N as it were asserts independently of his body: “But no! 
I am in pain!” It is true that Wittgenstein does not use the words inner-voice in discussing 
the purported private language. But not only is this option unavoidable for the 
interlocutor, also it is reasonably clear that Wittgenstein anticipates such a move. For 
instance, after taking the critic to task on the possibility of either naming a sensation, or 
making meaningful use of a sensation word (either to oneself or to anyone else) in the 
absence of any outward signs of a sensation, he declares at (PI §261), “So in the end 
when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an 
inarticulate sound.” But a private linguist cannot have even the luxury of “an inarticulate 
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sound”. Thus, Wittgenstein quickly adds, “—But such a sound is an expression only as it 
occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described.” (Ibid) At this 
point the supposed private language recedes into the inner sections of its speaker, as a last 
option. If our interlocutor claims that a private language is possible he can only be 
thinking along this line.13   
However, I do not intend to assess the plausibility of the idea of a private 
language yet, but simply to articulate what that idea might look like. Suppose we take the 
idea of a private language as it is so conceived. Is there any compelling reason why my 
interlocutor could not himself be a candidate for N? He could insist that his experience is 
not like that of N. But the question is whether his experience is different in any relevant 
respect. I could imagine a being that suffers from a physiological dysfunction, which 
prevents him from acting, saying or otherwise behaving in accordance with what he 
thinks or feels. He is therefore physically different from my interlocutor. But this is not a 
logically relevant difference. The interlocutor has to describe the hypothetical private 
linguist in such a way that it would be clear that it is logically impossible for him to act in 
a way that agrees with his sensations. Otherwise, he will succeed only in describing a 
person who is in fact, but not of necessity, unable to communicate his inner sensations to 
others.  
The interlocutor’s task is daunting. The person would have to show that it would 
be a contradiction for N to gain control of his body, i.e., for N to be cured of his 
condition. The question is whether we can conceive of some individual who cannot 
possibly speak his mind. What the interlocutor offers is perhaps an interesting and 
                                                 
13 This idea is discussed further in Chapter Three, Section I.2: ‘Alternative Readings of PI §§256ff’. 
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colourful case. But in terms of giving us reasons to believe that N has any necessarily 
different features from the interlocutor himself, it is questionable.  
My interlocutor therefore has no better reason to believe that the hypothetical N 
speaks a private language than he has to believe that he himself speaks one. And in 
general, any reason someone has to believe that a private language is possible is a reason 
he has to believe he himself speaks one. In other words, the only rational answer to Q2 in 
our hypothetical dialogue is “Yes”.  
 
Do you also acknowledge that you have a public language? I think it really does not 
matter how the opponent answers, though he is committed to a “Yes”. A “No” would 
suggest that the opponent is mistaken. For even by saying “No”, he uses a public 
language. Thus, he is committed to a “Yes”.  
In sum, I have argued that possession of a private language is compatible with 
possession of a public language. One cannot rationally maintain that a private language is 
possible without allowing that someone who uses it can also speak a public language. 
Therefore, if a language only the speaker can understand is possible, no one other than its 
user can know the language exists. Since no one else can have evidence that the language 
is being used, the language is comprehensible only to the speaker. The question, which I 
shall entertain in Chapter Four, is how all this might bear on the impossibility of a private 
language.  
But first, I should like to discuss some competing interpretations of the relevant 
passages from Wittgenstein in order to show where my views in the nature of private 
language agree or disagree with other views.  
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Chapter Three 




The idea of the nature of a private language put forth in Chapter Two is informed by the 
interpretations of certain sections of the relevant texts, especially: PI §§243-245, and PI 
§§256ff. According to my reading, PI §§243-245 provide an interesting account of the 
nature of a public language of sensation. PI §§256ff provide important insights into the 
nature of a private language of sensation. I now discuss competing interpretations of 
these sections in order to show where our views merge and or part.   
 
I.1 Alternative Readings of PI §§243-245  
 
The views I discuss in this section are those of (A) Hintikka, (B) Verheggen/Wright, and 
(C) Pears. Here are the relevant passages for the reader’s reference:  
  
(PI §243) A human can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and 
punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even 
imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their 
activities by talking to themselves.—An explorer who watched them and listened 
to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would 
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enable him to predict these people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them 
making resolutions and decisions.)  
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down 
or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the 
rest—for his private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language?—But 
that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what 
can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So 
another person cannot understand the language.  
 
(PI §244)    How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t seem to be any 
problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? 
But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This 
question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names 
of sensations?—of the word “pain” for example. Here is a possibility: words are 
connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of sensation and used in 
their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and 
teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behaviour.  
“So you are saying that the word “pain” really means crying?”—On the 
contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.  
  
I.1.A. Hintikka reads Wittgenstein at (PI §244) as suggesting an account of a ‘private 
language of sensation’. It is true that the private language problem is raised at the 
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previous section (PI §243). It is also true that Wittgenstein raises the question of how 
words refer to sensations at (PI §244). But Wittgenstein’s concerns are clearly about the 
ordinary (i.e., public) language of sensation, to make clear how the meaning of the 
sensations we name and talk about everyday are learned. Now if my worries are 
legitimate, Hintikka may have read PI §244 otherwise.14   
 
Hintikka (i)  
 
First, Hintikka restructures PI §§243 and 244 to create two new passages, i.e., a part of 
one original passage is presented along with a part of the other original passage. This 
restructuring, in my view, disturbs the natural flow of Wittgenstein’s idea.   
The first restructured passages: the first paragraph of PI §243 (henceforth 
‘a/§243’), detailing the possibility of understanding the language of a people who spoke 
only in monologues but who also make resolutions and decisions (‘A human being can 
encourage himself…’), is followed with the first half of PI §244 (‘a/§244’) where 
questions are raised about how words refer to sensations (‘How do words refer to 
sensations?...’). The contrast that Wittgenstein intends in the two paragraphs of PI §243 
is diminished, if not totally defeated. The expression with which the second paragraph 
begins: “But could we also imagine a language…” reveals the intention to draw a contrast 
between them. It also reveals what the contrast is about: the contrast drawn is between 
certain imaginary monologue linguists (monologists) whose language someone else can 
understand on the model of our language—for not only does the person watch their 
                                                 
14 Hintikka, “On Wittgenstein,” 2000, 40-1.  
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activities, but “he also hears them making resolutions and decisions”—and a purported 
(private) linguist whose words no one else can possibly understand.   
This clearly indicates that it is language itself, which in the former case is ‘open’, 
accessible, public and suchlike; but ‘private’, inaccessible, etc., in the latter case that 
Wittgenstein is contrasting. His concern therefore is whether the latter sort of language is 
possible. Of course, there is reference to sensations in the latter case, which is missing in 
the former. But are we to suppose that the monologists have no sensations? Or, that they 
do but do not talk about them? Presumably not; in any case, Wittgenstein does not 
specify what their words refer to, but only that they speak in monologues and that they 
accompany their words with activities as they do so. So if they do have and talk about 
their sensations, what contrast does Wittgenstein intend to draw between the language of 
the monologists and that of the private linguist? Is it that their sensations are not 
‘private’? Or, why else is Wittgenstein not concerned about their own case?—he 
certainly takes it for granted, or at least, considers it possible that their use of language 
(including language that refers to sensations) can be shared. In other words, if we 
interpret Wittgenstein’s concern at (PI §243) to be about how we manage to express 
private sensations, in light of the contrast he intends to draw, we are committed either to 
the view that the monologists have no sensations at all, or that they do have but their 
sensations are not private.  
What seems to follow is that Wittgenstein is concerned about the possibility of a 
language that is used privately; whose words refer to the inner experiences of its speaker, 
to whom alone it is comprehensible. The emphasis is between the modes of using the 
languages. The reason we might be able to translate the monologists’ language into ours 
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simply by watching them and listening to their talk is because their language is not 
‘hidden’; it is not used in private. Hacker seems to draw a similar contrast between 
[a/§243]: “the language of a solitary monologuist…” and the one purportedly spoken by a 
private linguist [b/§243]: “the explorer could not attain ‘agreement in the results of 
measurement’, for neither what measures nor what is measured would be accessible to 
him.”15  
The second restructured passages: the second paragraph of PI §243 (‘b/§243’) 
where the private language question itself is raised (‘But could we also imagine a 
language…’), is combined with the second part of PI §244 (‘b/§244’) where the 
suggestion is made that sensation, pain, is connected with pain-behaviour; and that verbal 
expressions of pain are a new pain-behaviour (‘This question is the same as: ...’). That 
suggestion cannot play the role it is assigned in its new position. On my reading, it is not 
an answer to the private language question at (PI §243), at least, not in the way that 
Hintikka envisages. Rather, it is a response – about the ordinary language scenario – to a 
question about everyday linguistic activities; “don’t we talk about sensations every day, 






                                                 
15 See, Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, 32. cf. also: “[T]he contrast W. is concerned with is […] 
rather between a sharable, translatable language on the one hand and an unsharable, untranslatable one on 
the other.” Ibid., 37-38.    
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Hintikka (ii)  
 
Second, one might ask what motivates Hintikka to restructure the remarks. He argues that 
a/§243 & a/§244 show clearly that Wittgenstein does not deny the reality or doubt the 
expressibility of any inner experiences. (That is true, depending on how Hintikka uses 
‘inner experiences’.) The problem, however, he says, is how “we manage to express 
them”.16 Hintikka continues, 
 
According to him [Wittgenstein], all meaning is mediated by public language-
games. But there apparently are no language-games where private experiences 
could play a role. Just because we are talking about private experience, there 
cannot be any other person looking over my shoulder to check whether I am 
referring to my sensations correctly.17 
   
I do not think this works. Hintikka assumes that Wittgenstein is concerned here at 
(a/§243 & a/§244) with private sensations. But a discussion of the supposed notion of 
privacy (of sensations) only begins at PI §246: ‘In what sense are my sensations 
private?’)18 It is true that Wittgenstein raises questions about how words refer to 
sensations, etc., at a/§244, but it is incorrect to equate such questions to a concern with 
private sensations. Wittgenstein acknowledges sensations but by no means considers 
                                                 




18 Note that ‘private’ is first used here in italics. What I make of this is that Wittgenstein is making it clear 
that the following/subsequent discussion of the term is at variance with his view—with the sense of PI 
§244—but perhaps in line with the problem introduced earlier at PI §243 (2nd Para.).     
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them private; at least, not in the sense that privacy presents a problem. In that respect, 
questions like: “How do we manage to express them?”, if ‘them’ denotes private 
sensations, ought not to worry him.  I am not saying that Wittgenstein is not concerned in 
any way about private sensations. He is at least obliged to think through the idea, and 
that, precisely, is the bone of contention with his imaginary critic at PI §§246-255, but 
not at PI §244).19  
(b/§243 & b/§244) is more telling. There is no doubt that b/§243 expresses the 
private language question. But Hintikka’s reading of b/§244 is questionable. For Hintikka 
then raises the question: “But how can such a private language operate?” And follows up 
with (b/§244):  
 
The question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the 
names of sensations?—of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: 
words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of the sensation and 
used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to 
him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new 
pain-behaviour.20     
 
Hintikka suggests here that the question “But how can such a private language operate?” 
is the same as “How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?” 
                                                 
19 Jacquette, it seems, shares the view that Wittgenstein holds that sensations are private, but only attacks 
the idea that particular sensations could be named. See Dale Jacquette, “Wittgenstein's Manometer and the 
Private Language Argument,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15, no.1 (1998): 112- 5.  
 
20 Hintikka, On Wittgenstein, op. cit, 41.  
 
 42
But it is doubtful that all talk about the primitive and natural expressions of sensation, 
etc., (at PI §244) should be taken as describing how a supposedly private language—a 
language that no one distinct from its speaker can possibly comprehend—operates. How 
could there be natural expressions of private sensations? Hintikka reads Wittgenstein to 
argue that private sensations are real, but that we are able to talk about them through a 
language game that connects them to their spontaneous expressions. Hintikka’s words 
are: “In other words, one language game that can give our pain vocabulary its meaning 
involves spontaneous expressions of pain.”21 Since for him, pain would count as a private 
experience. At any rate, it is true that there is an element of spontaneity in the relation of 
the natural expression of pain and the sensation of pain. But I disagree strongly that such 
an account is about a private language of sensation or even about a language of private-
sensations (or private-sensations language).22  
He argues further,  
 
Wittgenstein’s point could be seen more clearly if he had allowed us the 
counterlogical thought-experiment of private language. The problem could then 
be to correlate these idiosyncratic idioms so as to merge them into our public 
language. Then it becomes obvious that such an interpretation of private language 
can only take place with the help of some publicly available framework.23    
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 41.  
 
22 Not surprisingly, Dale Jacquette uses the term ‘private sensation language’. The phrase misrepresents 
Wittgenstein’s concern. See Jacquette, “Wittgenstein's Manometer” 1998, 112. Given the current 
discussion, I believe that Hintikka alludes to a similar idea.   
 
23 Hintikka, On Wittgenstein, 41.  
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But in the first place, what Wittgenstein is aiming at (b/§244) is the foundation of our 
ordinary language of sensation. Second, if we interpret the operation of a private 
language in this way, as a language that relies on a “publicly available framework”, then 
the question whether such a language might be possible is stillborn. I agree with Hintikka 
that a “counterlogical thought-experiment of private language”, had Wittgenstein 
provided one, would certainly have helped clarify his views on the private language 
argument much better. It would be interesting to entertain such a thought-experiment 
anyway; but the problem is what the thought-experiment might involve. It would 
probably help to know a bit more about the nature of the putative private language itself 
such as I have attempted above (cf. Chapter Two, III).   
As the experiment has shown, it is open to a would-be private linguist, or indeed a 
proponent of private language, to appeal to some ‘private’ version of the account in PI 
§244. Thus, PI §244 on the contrary, is an account of the ordinary, public, language of 
sensation in light of which one could make sense of a private language. Hintikka 
correctly points out: “[L]anguage games are more than mediators of the language-world 
relations. They are also our entry into language. What the learner is trained in is playing 
an entire language-game.”24 But the point of PI §244 is that the concept of language-
games applies to the learning of both ‘public language’ and the ‘ordinary language of 
sensation’. But it would be misleading to conflate the latter with a putative private 
language of sensation.25      
                                                 
24 Ibid., 39.  
 
25 I mean by public language expressions, e.g.: “Twice two is four”, “There goes the bird again, it has been 
living on that tree for seven days!” etc., and by ordinary (public) language of sensation, say, “I feel a 
throbbing pain in my head; but an itch on my foot!” Both, arguably, are a part of (public) language-games. 
On my reading, it is the learning of the latter that PI §244 accounts for. If that account were to deal with the 




The disagreement with Hintikka’s reading of PI §§243-244 puts in question his notion of 
“interpretational idea” on which he contends: 
 
[T]he way one should read Wittgenstein is to focus on the beginning of the work 
or section of the work in question. A careful reading of the early pages will show 
the general picture he was painting or, rather, a sketch of its main features. The 
rest of the work has to be read with the main ideas revealed by the outline firmly 
in mind, always asking how what Wittgenstein says fits into the larger picture.26 
 
One might agree with Hintikka that focusing on the first few pages, sections, of a work 
could provide useful insights into understanding the ideas of a writer. Nonetheless, a 
disagreement could still occur on the understanding of those ‘first’ ideas. That is the case 
in the present circumstance. The tension between Hintikka’s reading of PI §§243/244 
(perhaps of the whole private language argument) and the one I propose here, can be put 
thus: on the one hand is the claim, ‘sensations are private (or more appropriately, private 
sensations are real); but we can talk about them’, and, on the other hand is, ‘sensations 
are not private, since we can and do talk about them’, i.e., that others understand 
sufficiently the language with which we refer to them. It seems to me that the latter view 
is more like a claim Wittgenstein is defending. Hintikka believes Wittgenstein to be 
making the former claim: “Private experiences are likewise eminently real. That we can 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
26 Hintikka, On Wittgenstein, 10.  
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speak of them only with the help of a public language-game does not set them apart from 
the rest of reality.27 But after the attack against the very idea of privacy, on all fronts—
epistemic, logical/semantic, etc., (PI §246ff)28, it is a surprise that Wittgenstein can be so 
interpreted.   
An upshot of this gulf is a certain consideration: whether the private language 
argument, or better still, §§243-300s of the Investigations is interesting not only by itself, 
but also, as I believe, as proof of some other philosophical claims, or whether it is an 
appendage of some sort whose main role is to assert the consistency of some other claims 
that are attributable to Wittgenstein. In Hintikka’s words, “Wittgenstein has to deny the 
possibility of a private language because its possibility would be a counter-example to his 
thesis of the universal role of language games as mediators of meaning.”29 However, I 
am convinced that the said PLA sections can be assigned a more important role.   
                                                
Pursuing that goal starts with putting PI §§243/244 in proper perspective. My 
view is that having retorted that we normally speak about sensations, Wittgenstein owes 
us an account of how we so refer to them in the ordinary sense: “Well, can’t we do so in 
our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean.” It is by allowing us such a 
framework involving the connection between the thing named and the name, that we can 
possibly have any inkling about how a purported private language might work and 
possibly understand the idea in whose face a putative private language is supposed to fly. 
In other words, the two sections should be allowed their natural flow. PI §243 introduces 
 
27 Ibid., 42; cf. Jacquette, “Wittgenstein’s Manometer”, 112.    
 
28 Cf. Kenny, “Wittgenstein,” rev. ed. 185-90, 2006. 
 
29 Hintikka, On Wittgenstein, 40.  
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us to a hypothetical problem. PI §244 provides a framework against which to understand 
and debate the hypothetical problem by furnishing us with an account of how ‘we do so 
[speak about our sensations] in our ordinary language’. Without a PI §244, it would have 
been impossible to proceed.   
 
I.1.B. Verheggen’s comment on PI §243 is very short. So I will quote it and offer a few 
remarks: 
 
 Another person cannot understand the language because the words in the private 
vocabulary are in no way connected to outward manifestations of the sensations 





Here, I read Verheggen to correctly interpret a private language as a language whose 
words refer to sensations that have no connection to sensation-behaviour; presumably in 
contrast to the words of a “public language” (of sensation) at PI §244. But Verheggen’s 
reference to ‘private vocabulary’ is of concern to me. That concern is heightened by her 
footnote on the quoted comment, which is held in sympathy with Crispin Wright: 
 
                                                 
30 Verheggen, “Wittgenstein and ‘Solitary’ Languages,” 1995, n. 2, p. 329.  
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[T]his is not to say that there may not be a sense in which a private language, if it 
were possible, could be understood by more than one person. This would be the 
case if two individuals could independently develop a language whose words 
would apply to the same kinds of ‘inner’ things. But, of course, they could not use 
their language to communicate with each other, and so, in the relevant sense, their 
language would still be private.”31 
 
I agree with Verheggen (and Wright) that if there were more than one private 
linguist, they could not possibly share their linguistic ability with each other.32 I agree 
that neither of two or more putative private linguists could have any reason to believe the 
other is using a private language. This is a consequence of the fact that a private language 
is one only its user can possibly know to exist. In short, it does follow from my view that 
two people could both use a language privately, but could never know that they are doing 
so. Again, I agree, as Verheggen seems to suggest, that the referents of a private language 
must be sensations of a kind that it is possible for more than one person to have. (cf. 
Chapter Two, II.1. and II.2.) 
However I disagree with both Verheggen and Wright’s claim that two people 
could both have a private language, though they could not know that the words of their 
language share similar meanings, i.e., the words have similar inner referents. So I 
disagree with both Verheggen and Wright’s claim that more than one person could, 
                                                 
31 Cf. Crispin J. G. Wright, “Does Philosophical Investigations §258-60 Suggest a Cogent Argument 
against Private Language?” in Subject, Thought, and Context, J. McDowell and P. Pettit, eds. (Oxford UP, 
1986), 209-66. Republished in Crispin Wright, Rails to Infinity (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 223-5.   
  
32 Contra: Moser, “Beyond the Private Language Argument”, 85-6.  
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nonetheless, understand a private language, if it existed. For, their interpretation suggests 
that two people whose ‘public’ words (which words?) “apply to the same kinds of ‘inner’ 
things” independently speak a (the same) language, though the one cannot possibly know 
the other does. For they cannot reasonably believe that the words of their language refer 
to the same ‘kinds of inner things’, otherwise, the meanings of their language will 
become public. In light of this, Crispin Wright advises, 
 
Private language had better be, not a language which necessarily only one person 
can understand, but a language which necessarily no two people can have 
adequate reason to believe they share. If your pain-quale is inaccessible to me and 
constitutive of your understanding of ‘pain’, what (uncontroversially) follows is 
not that your understanding cannot coincide with mine but only that I cannot have 
adequate reason to think that it does.33  
 
This advice is clear. But I doubt that such an interpretation of a ‘private language’ works, 
which probably explains the divide between Wright’s and the interpretation that I 
support. In any case, this is not the sense in which I think that someone might use a 
private language; where the referent of the word of my private language is inaccessible to 
someone besides me and is constitutive of my meaning of the word of that language. 
Earlier in this chapter, the reader would recall, the critic’s doubt that we have any rational 
justification for believing that other people have certain qualities of phenomenal 
experiences as we do was dispelled. But the more important point is the recognition that 
                                                 
33 Crispin Wright, “Rails to Infinity”, 224.  
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dispelling such a doubt is not the relevant polemic against the possibility of a private 




Perhaps we should ask why it is necessarily impossible for two people (two would-be 
private linguists) who use ‘different’ words to refer to similar kinds of inner experiences 
to have adequate reason to believe that they share the meanings of their words (i.e., that 
their words share similar inner referents). Why the using of, say, different, words by two 
or more would-be private linguists to refer to similar sensations is any different from that 
of the public linguists, such that in the case of public linguists, they are justified in 
believing that their words have identical referents. But as it were, we are no more 
justified in the case of public linguists than we are in that of the would-be private 
linguists. The attempts in both cases to justify the belief that when two people use 
different words, the referents of their words are similar are undermined by similar 
problems.  
If Verheggen/Wright is right, the only reason to think a private language is 
possible is equally a reason to think a public language is impossible. If a private language 
is possible, that is because it is impossible for one speaker to communicate his linguistic 
intentions to another; but these intentions are just the sort of “inner states” that the terms 
of a private language are supposed to refer to.34 But if it is impossible for anyone to know 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 224.  
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anyone else’s linguistic intentions, then all communication is impossible – all language 
would be private language.  
The question is what merit there is in investigating the possibility of a private 
language if our justification for believing we had a public one is in doubt, i.e., whether 
we have adequate reason to believe that our public words have similar referents for others 
as they do for us or that others do have similar intentions as us when they use similar 
words as we do. In this sense, it seems that the Wrightean conception of private language 
concedes too much to the proponent of a private language. If a private language were to 
be one whose words no two people could possibly have adequate reason to believe they 
share, we would then put ourselves at a double disadvantage. For not only do we have to 
show what a private language would look like, if it were possible, but we also have to 
show that we do have a public language. As it were, one would have to prove that a 
public language is possible in order to prove that a private language is not.  
But our concern is much different, if not simpler. It is to understand the nature of 
a language whose sensation words only its speaker can possibly understand. And this 
should not be motivated such that the logical gap between a putative private language and 
a public one would collapse. More so, the proponent of a private language is, in the 
relevant sense, of a different kind from the sceptic who cast doubt on the possibility of 






I.1.C. On his reading of PI §§243-245, Pears argues, 
 
[B]efore the advent of language the connections that are going to make it possible 
are already in our nervous systems. The word “pain”, for example, has a place 
ready-made for it in the circuit of stimulus, feeling and response. It cannot be an 
accident that this point is made very emphatically right at the beginning of the 
Private Language Argument.  
It is true that Wittgenstein does not make the point in neural terms. He 
merely notes the regular succession of three kinds of event, the physical damage, 
the feeling and the natural reaction to the feeling. However, the precise 
formulation of the idea matters less than the idea itself, which is that this kind of 
basis for setting up a sensory vocabulary must sometimes be available before the 
words can be introduced.35  
  
In my opinion, Pears correctly identifies the important foundation of (sensation) language 
as enunciated at the beginning of the Private Language Argument. But I have reservations 
about Pears’ views. It is true that the private linguist who obviously would have to 
operate outside this requirement cannot possibly “sort out and classify the different types 
of sense-data that he receives without making any use of any information about the 
physical world.”36 But as he sees it, (a.) that impossibility rests on the inability of the 
private linguist to establish a criterion of success: “a detectable difference between a 
                                                 
35 David Pears, “The Structure of the Private Language Argument,” 270.  
 
36 Ibid., p. 264. 
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thing’s merely seeming to belong to a type and its actually belonging to that type”37; and 
(b.) that the over-all goal of the private language argument is to counter a rival, Cartesian, 
interpretation of the original position in the evolution of our language: “the attempt to 
establish a language in the Cartesian original position.” My concern about (a.) is the 
apparent suggestion that the private language argument is primarily aimed at establishing 
the impossibility of setting up such a language, as well as Pears’ apparent appeal to 
verificationism in arguing for this impossibility. 38 In the case of (b.), I am simply of the 













                                                 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Ibid., 268-270. Pears may have changed his mind about an aspect of the verificationist reading of the 
PLA. See David Pears, ‘Private Language [with reply from Hintikka],’ in The Philosophy of Jaakko 
Hintikka, edited by Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, 393-411. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing 
Company, 2006).     
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I.2 Alternative Readings of PI §§256ff  
 
The lesson from the foregoing analysis of an ordinary (public), versus a private language 
of sensation is most striking at (PI §256), where Wittgenstein raises afresh the question 
of a language I use to describe my sensation and that only I can possibly understand. To 
try to make sense of this idea, Wittgenstein asks: “But suppose I didn’t have any natural 
expression for the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use 
these names in description.” The question is what it might mean for a language for 
describing the inner experiences not to connect to any natural expressions of sensation. 
Wittgenstein’s response, as we have seen, is that the private linguist would have to 
‘simply associate names with sensations’. But how might one ‘simply associate names 
with sensations’? Recall the discussion so far on the public language of sensation—the 
connection between a sensation, the natural expression of the sensation, and the name of 
the sensation. Now, if one had no natural expressions of sensation, the question is how 
might the names of sensations be learned, and then used.  
To answer his question, we must slow down, to better appreciate the predicament. 





Wittgenstein’s immediate response to the question of what might follow if human beings 
showed no public sign of a sensation is that it would be impossible to teach a child the 
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names of sensations. (PI §257) According to Hacker, “that … a name of an unexpressed 
sensation could not be taught is brushed aside as irrelevant, for W. concentrates on the 
question of what it is to name a sensation (§257).”39 I think this reading is a mistake. 
Hacker may have missed the motivation of the remark about the unteachability of 
sensation-names that are not tied to sensation-behaviour, and also its force. PI §256 does 
not only witness a restating of the private language question, but it is also Wittgenstein’s 
attempt to make sense of what a private language would be like. The task he introduces 
here is that of understanding what a private language would be like, if it were possible.    
One useful approach to addressing that task is to draw up a ‘private’ analogue of 
the ordinary, public, language of sensation that Wittgenstein lays bare at PI §244, i.e., to 
consider a private language as one whose learning or use is necessarily not tied up with 
the speaker’s natural expressions of sensation. The upshot of that proposal is the question 
that PI §257 opens with—about what it would be like if human beings showed no natural 
expressions of pain—which immediately draws the response that Hacker claims 
Wittgenstein considers “irrelevant”. Hacker may have under-appreciated the remark at 
(PI §244) which, as I have argued, underscores the very foundation of the learning and 
the use of ordinary sensation language. He states: “‘S’ names a sensation of pain if the 
first-person use of ‘S’ in an utterance replaces the natural behavioural expression of the 
sensation.”40 Here Hacker seems to suggest that (PI §244) states a sufficient condition for 
naming S. But I am of the view that Wittgenstein advances in that remark a necessary and 
                                                 
39 Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, 5, cf. 115.  
 
40 Ibid., 3.  
 
 55
sufficient condition for a successful use of the ordinary language of sensation (which is 
reaffirmed at PI §256; cf. note MS 179, 1241).  
The point Wittgenstein is making with the opening question at (PI §257), and the 
response to it, could be rephrased thus: “If human beings shewed no outward signs of 
pain, then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘toothache’”. Could 
one rightly claim or read Wittgenstein to treat the consequent of this conditional as 
irrelevant? It would seem at first that Hacker is doing exactly that, but the problem with 
this becomes clearer as he continues: 
 
The first and obvious anxiety is raised by the interlocutor: sensation-names would 
not be teachable. W. brushes this aside, for this is the least of the troubles 
consequent upon the supposition. We may, for the sake of argument, assume that 
the child invents a name for the sensation and so does not have to be taught (for 
the genesis of a capacity is irrelevant to the explanation of what the capacity 
is).”42  
 
Here, Hacker attributes the said remark: “Then it would be impossible to teach a child the 
use of the word ‘tooth-ache’.” to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor. I find this difficult to accept. 
Contrary to Hacker’s view, it is in the interest of the interlocutor to counter that remark, 
not to utter it. And that is precisely what leads to the rebuttal about the child being a 
genius and supposedly inventing a name for the sensation. Once Hacker misunderstands 
                                                 




the flow of the discussion, it is easy to see how and why he thinks the question is 
irrelevant.   
The remark on the unteachability of sensation names is not irrelevant, and neither 
does Wittgenstein dismiss it. For it raises not only the question of learning, but also that 
of how one might use a language of sensation whose words are necessarily not tied to 
sensation-behaviour. In light of the problem of unteachability, one way the critic can 
respond is to argue that one can, for instance, “invent a name for the sensation”—as the 
child-genius is purportedly able to do (PI §257). 
One difficulty arising from the impossibility of teaching a language of sensation 
whose words connect to no outward signs of sensations is the problem of learning 
sensation-names, which has evidently engaged the attention of most commentators. It is 
rightly pointed out that one can assume the child is clever enough to invent sensation-
names for himself. The question, however, is whether the naming could be done 
independently of the grammar of the ordinary language of sensation modelled at PI §244. 
This is a question that Wittgenstein takes up at PI §258.  
The important concern at PI §258 is not whether the name that the child-genius 
purportedly gives the sensation can successfully be assigned a private definition, but 
whether one could make sense of the idea that the private linguist or the child-genius can 
do so in purely private terms. The interesting point about the thought-experiment, as I see 
it, is Wittgenstein’s inability to describe a possible private-naming scenario without 
employing words whose use have already been stationed in the grammar of ordinary 
language.   
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Stroud argues along similar lines. The supposition is that one can name a 
sensation outside of the ordinary language scenario so that the name connects with the 
sensation, but in no way with a natural expression of sensation. This Stroud says, is an 
idea that requires a “philosophical ‘treatment’” – `a la PI §254: “In PI §258 the 
‘treatment’ amounts, more or less, to trying to do it. Wittgenstein tries to imagine a good 
case of the attempt’s being made and then brings out what stands in the way of success, 
and why.”43 To bring the point home quickly, the naming is done with a bare ceremony 
of concentrating one’s attention on the sensation, which immediately attracts the familiar 
objection that nothing would count as the criterion of correct use of such a name or word. 
As the whole ceremony is empty, Stroud agrees with Wittgenstein that “whatever is 
going to seem right to me is right, and that that only means that here we cannot even talk 
about “right” at all.”44   
According to Stroud, what makes the ceremony of naming empty is the fact that 
however one tries, whatever name, sign, or sensation-word the person might come up 
with, will be predicated of a thing that merits the public word ‘sensation’, e.g., ‘“S” is a 
sensation’ or ‘such-and-such is a  sensation.’ It is no help, even if the word ‘sensation’ is 
avoided and ‘something’ is used instead. Stroud correctly reads Wittgenstein further: 
 
‘It would not help’, he [Wittgenstein] says, ‘to say that it need not be a sensation; 
that when he [the private linguist] writes “S” he has something—and that is all 
that can be said. “Has” and “something” also belong to our common language’ 
                                                 
43 Barry Stroud, Meaning, Understanding, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 74.  
 
44 Ibid., 75.   
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(PI §261). They too have a ‘grammar’; there are ‘posts’ at which those words are 
‘stationed’, just as there are ‘posts’ for the words “pain” and “sensation”.  
  
Thus, the new candidates for the private linguist’s sensation-words fail for similar 
reasons that the previous ones were rejected.  
But this inability is not peculiar to Wittgenstein; it is not a shortcoming someone 
just happens to suffer. It seems impossible that anyone can possibly refer to a sensation 
without referring to something to which the words “sensation” and “something” apply, 
i.e., without using public words! It is clear that PI §261 is not merely a critique of the 
child-genius. For the child-genius is in a similar predicament as us: he cannot appeal to 
any words whose positions have already being determined in the grammar of our 
ordinary language. “So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point 
where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an 
expression only as it occurs in a particular language game, which should now be 
described.” (PI §261)   
This last remark, Stroud says, is ‘Wittgenstein’s parting shot’. He says, it ‘seems 
simply to be a request or a demand for a description of a language-game or institution 
which could give some kind of meaning to the hitherto inarticulate sound introduced by 
the ‘private’ speaker.’ Having recognized this point, he denies that PI §258 ‘amounts to a 
conclusive proof [of the impossibility of a private language], or even to an argument 
which purports to be conclusive.’45 For, as he rightly points out, a challenge to describe a 
scenario in which a private language might be used is no claim that such a description is 
impossible. But it would be wrong to read Stroud here to argue that the private language 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 78. 
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argument itself is inconclusive. For that would depend on what we can make of that 
challenge; of describing a putative private language scenario. To take this further step is 



























Having discussed the character of a hypothetical private language, the question is how it 
might throw light on the private language argument itself. In this chapter, I address the 
question of the possibility of a private language. I argue that, as Wittgenstein contends, a 
private language is impossible.   
First a quick recap of the theses defended so far:    
 
A. A private language is either a language only the speaker can possibly know 
exists, or the only language its speaker can possibly have.46  
 
B. Possession of a private language is compatible with possession of public 
language.47  
 
C. Therefore, a private language is a language only the speaker can possibly 
know exists. (A & B).  
 
                                                 
46 Cf. Chapter Two, I & II. 
 
47 Cf. Chapter Two, III.  
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There is a sense in which the interpretation of the private language argument in 
the secondary literature might be organized purely on claims about where the argument 
supposedly resides in the text. It is (i) generally believed that the private language 
problem itself is raised specifically at PI §243 and the argument is thought to run through 
the §§300s; that is, until Kripke’s bold commentary. (ii) The private language argument 
‘as it struck Kripke’ resides in the sections preceding PI §243 of the text. That view 
focuses on §§198-202, in particular. (iii) Although not many scholars are persuaded by 
Kripke’s ‘radical’, sceptical view, a significant number of them are interested in some of 
the other issues that Kripke raises. 
The question about the location of the private language argument presents an 
interesting overview to understanding the PLA literature. The ‘traditional’ group, (i), 
argues that the latter sections (PI §§243-300s) embody the private language problem, 
properly understood, and a significant account of the argument for its impossibility. For 
them, the argument raises questions like stage-setting, and language-games, private 
ostensive definition, verification, and scepticism about memory, the problem of 
consciousness, meaning, and such like. The Kripke group, (ii), contends on the other 
hand that the sections (PI §§243-300s) have little or nothing to do with the PLA. As 
Kripke puts it, the problem of ‘private language’ can be discussed independently of the 
latter sections—even if doing so “seems like a presentation of Hamlet without the prince 
[…] there are many other interesting characters in the play.”48 The private language 
                                                 
48 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an Elementary Exposition, 7th printing 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982/1994), 6, cf. 79). For a recent, renewed, vigorous 
defence of Kripke’s radical interpretation, see Martin Kusch, A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules 




argument, for him, is the concern about a ‘sceptical paradox’ with regards to the ‘notion 
of rules’ and some account of a ‘sceptical solution’ to the paradox.  
Most scholars in (iii) reject the sceptical reading of the PLA; they are however 
attracted to its rule-following discourse. They argue that the discussions raised in PI 
§§198-202 underscore the private language problem, and the conclusion is already stated 
at §202. The latter groups (ii) & (iii) concede that PI §§243-300s are significant, but only 
as it throws up a possible counter-example to the claims defended in the earlier sections. 
On this model, one can contrast (i) with (iii) and both (i) & (iii) with (ii).49  
But, as interesting as this model might be, I have refrained from going by it. The 
model I propose raises a different question. What is it that Wittgenstein purportedly 
reduces to absurdity in the private language argument sections (§§243-300s) of the 
Philosophical Investigations? I think the same question can be asked about a supposed 
private linguist in the following way: is the problem in the so-called private language 
argument about the apparent impossibility of a would-be private linguist to set up an 
alternative language of sensation only he supposedly can understand, or is it about the 
apparent impossibility of the person to use a language of sensation purportedly in 
private? These questions correspond to different conceptions of the private linguist’s task.   
The tension is about the task of a hypothetical private linguist: whether the person 
can possibly set up (develop) a language that is purportedly private, or whether the 
                                                 
49 See, for instance (i) Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (An Analytical 
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations; vol. 1. 2nd edition, extensively revised by P.M.S. 
Hacker) (Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), cf. Hacker (and Baker), Wittgenstein: 
Meaning and Mind, cf.  Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, chap. 10; Hintikka, On Wittgenstein; 
Pears, “The Structure of the Private Language Argument”, The False Prison, 2 vols. (Clarendon Press, 
1988); Kenny, Wittgenstein, (rev. ed.), McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). (ii) 
Kripke, “Wittgenstein on rules and private language.” (iii) McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality; Wright, 
Rails to Infinity; Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of his Earlier Thought (N.Y.: Basil 
Blackwell Inc., 1986)  
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person can possibly use a language in private. The perspective of this thesis is that 
defining the supposed task of a would-be private linguist is the way to throw light on the 
question of impossibility (or otherwise) of a putative private language. The alternative 
language theorists, as I call them, are concerned about whether the supposed private 
linguist can set up an alternative language, follow a rule, or principle, or previous 
intention (e.g., McDowell, Malcolm, McGinn, Kripke, Blackburn);  whether a 
languageless individual can deliberately establish a linguistic practice (e.g., Verheggen, 
Blackburn), or whether someone who has never been in communication with others can 
develop a language only he can possibly understand (e.g., Davidson).  Wittgenstein’s 
concern in the PLA sections is with a language of sensation. That said; I am of the 
opinion that his concern is not so much whether a private language of sensation can be set 
up, but essentially about whether one can make sense of a language of sensation used not 
‘as we ordinarily do’, but in private—that is, whether a private use of the language of 
sensation is coherent. Hintikka and Hacker (with Baker) hold some versions of the latter 
view. At least, they differ significantly from the earlier group.50 
Again, someone might ask: How is “a private language is possible” to be 
understood? I take this sentence to mean, “someone can use a language privately”, or 
“someone can make private use of a language”. In short, that someone can make a private 
speech act. It is common to pose the question in respect of a would-be private language. 
But to ask “Is a private language possible?” is the same as to ask “Can anyone possibly 
                                                 
50 See McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality; Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden; Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on 
Meaning; Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language; Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, 
Verheggen, “Wittgenstein on ‘Solitary’ Languages”; Davidson, “The Second Person,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy XVII (1992): 255-267. See also, Hintikka, On Wittgenstein; Hacker, Wittgenstein: 




use a language privately?” For, it makes little sense to say one can raise questions about 
the possibility of a language, but not be able, at least in principle, to raise questions about 
the possibility of its being used. The question about the language itself is of the same 
kind with the question about its mode of use. Thus, a claim like “if a private language is 
possible, then no one distinct from its speaker can know the language exists” can be 
rephrased, with its meaning intact, thus: “if anyone can use a language privately (or make 
a private speech act), then no one distinct from the speaker can know that a language is 
used.”  
It is important to underscore this point now in order to avoid possible 
misunderstanding in the future. For instance, it might be legitimate to raise a question, 
e.g., “what is the structure of a private language?” or, “does a private language have the 
same grammatical structure as a public language?” if we view our inquiry strictly and 
only on the basis of the former expression—“a private language is possible”. But the 
questions would be misplaced if posed about the latter expression: “someone can use a 
language privately”. In this latter form, it is clear that the emphasis is on how it is 
purportedly used. The concern about a private language, I believe, is not about its 
structure, component parts or what the language would “look” like; but how it could be 
used. In other words, it is not a concern about a (private) language that is structurally (or 
metaphysically) different from an otherwise public language, but about a language 
purportedly used in private, i.e., about the hypothetical private use of a language. Thus, 
when Wittgenstein raises the question of the possibility of a private language, his concern 
is whether anyone can conceivably make a private speech, or use a language privately. If 
the reader however, insists that the two phrases—‘to have a private language’ and ‘to 
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make a private speech, or use a language privately’—are distinct, I should like to say, as I 
believe Wittgenstein does, that I use the phrase ‘private language’ to include both.    
In the first part of this chapter, I argue the impossibility of a private language, i.e., 
a language someone can use in private. In the second part, I discuss how the other 
interpretation – the impossibility of someone to set up a purportedly private language – 
might be motivated in order to show where and why I make a break with it. The conflict 
here can be defined thus: the alternative interpretation questions whether a putative 
private language can be developed or established. While the interpretation that this thesis 
supports questions whether someone can use a language in private; that is, it is no matter 
how the person comes by it. That settled; the question that the opponent has to answer is 
how exactly the possibility (or otherwise) of a private language turns on that of setting up 
an alternative language. What precisely about the possibility of setting up a distinct 












I. The Impossibility of using a language in private  
      
Given that a private language – a language only its speaker can possibly understand, and 
whose words refer to the inner experiences of its speaker – is a language only the speaker 
can possibly know exists, I argue that its speaker cannot use the language to say anything 
to him or herself.  
Call any language the existence of which can be known only to its speaker a 
“hidden language.” What we have found so far is that any private language would have to 
be a hidden language. The argument against the possibility of a hidden language takes the 
following shape: 
 
1. If a hidden language is possible, then it must be possible to use it to perform 
different kinds of speech acts. (Premise)  
 
2. If it is possible to use a language to perform different kinds of speech acts, 
then the language must have an appropriate connection with the public life of 
its speaker. (Premise) 
 
3. If a language has an appropriate connection with the public life of its speaker, 
then someone besides its speaker can know the language exists. (Premise) 
 
4. If a hidden language is possible, then someone besides its speaker can know 
the hidden language exists. (1, 2 & 3) 
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 5. But it is not possible for someone besides the speaker of a hidden language to 
know that the hidden language exists. (Premise: true by def. Chapter Two) 
 
6. Therefore, a hidden language is not possible. (4, 5)     
 
In what follows, I defend the premises (1, 2 & 3) of the argument in detail.  
 
 If a hidden language is possible, then it must be possible to use it to perform different 
kinds of speech acts. Language in general cannot exist in the absence of the possibility of 
using it in different ways. In the ordinary use of language, there are different kinds of 
speech acts, such as questioning, commanding, asserting, assuming, and promising. 
Wittgenstein is emphatic on this point: “But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say 
assertion, questions, and commands?—There are countless kinds: countless different 
kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. […] the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a life form.” (PI §23) For this activity to be possible, 
it is necessary that there be different modes of using the language. When someone makes 
a statement, he uses language in one mode rather than another.  
For a private use of language to be possible, it must be possible privately to use 
language to express a doubt, and to affirm or deny a claim, among other activities. And at 
least in theory, it must be possible to specify how the individual speech acts can be 
differentiated one from the other—how, for instance, one can possibly differentiate 
between private questions, assertions, etc. If someone can use language, he can, at least in 
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theory, use it to perform speech acts of more than one kind, even if he never actually does 
perform more than one kind of speech act.   
Or so I claim. Could there perhaps be a creature incapable of performing more 
that a single kind of speech act? Imagine language, perhaps at its most primitive level, 
used by a firefly. Suppose each time the firefly’s organ glows, it asserts “I want to mate.” 
And the opposite sex can only assert in return, “I want to mate too” by emitting a similar 
light. So the only ‘speech act’ the firefly can possibly perform is to assert its sexuality. In 
this case, to conceive of the firefly performing any other speech act would amount to 
making the firefly what it is not.  
But I am not concerned with the use of language at such a primitive level. 
Whether or not fireflies can use language or perform more than one speech act is not 
relevant to this study. My concern is whether a private language that one used to speak of 
one’s own sensations could be a language that could be used to perform only one kind of 
speech act. Anyway, as we established earlier, only someone who takes himself to engage 
in private speech believes that private speech is possible. The proponent of the possibility 
of a private language is committed to the possibility of a human being who makes 
assertions about his own sensations in private, but who cannot possibly perform any other 
kind of private speech acts.  
Here an objection might be raised. Imagine a person with a serious mental 
problem. He uses a language privately, but only to make assertions; he cannot raise 
questions or make promises or perform any other kinds of speech acts. It might even be 
said that to imagine this person to do more than make assertions is to imagine a drastic 
change of the individual. However, I do not think this is a counter-example to the modest 
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claim that I am making: i.e., that the possibility of using a language privately necessarily 
implies the possibility of performing different kinds of speech acts in that manner. I have 
already considered this objection in my discussion of a being who struggled in vain to 
communicate his sensations. The idea of a hypothetical private linguist who could not 
possibly use a public language failed, as I argued earlier, because it seemed inconceivable 
that there could be someone who could not conceivably speak his mind.51  
The crux of this objection is that it is logically possible that N could not perform 
any hidden speech-acts other than assertions, and that it might be part of N’s very identity 
that he suffered from this limitation. But is it really inconceivable, without destroying the 
speaker’s identity, that, in addition to making assertions, he assumes that he feels pain, or 
promises (or commands) himself not to think about past pain, or asks himself whether 
what he feels is a pain or a tickle?  Could the person be logically incapable of performing 
these different kinds of speech-acts? It seems not. The ability to perform one speech-act, I 
believe, is intimately connected with the capacity to perform different types of speech-
acts. It seems none of these capacities can be logically isolated from all the others. This is 
a plausible assumption for which there are many analogous cases.  
The ability of a person, for instance, to make a left turn is logically related to the 
person’s capacity to make a right turn (or vice-versa). It might be possible to imagine a 
being that is constituted in a way that the only kind of turns he can possibly make is to 
the left. That such a being lacks the capacity to make any turns to the right. But this is not 
a counter-example to the claim that the capacity to make left and right turns are internally 
related. For a being who supposedly lacks the capacity to make any other kind of turns 
but the left ones will perpetually move in circles. We can hardly say of such a being that 
                                                 
51 See Chapter Two, III. 
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he is making left turns. In a similar way, it is hard to see how the capacity to add numbers 
could be logically isolated from the ability to subtract or multiply them. It is impossible 
to conceive of someone who can successfully put together 9kg of apples in multiples of 
3kg, but who cannot possibly share out 9kg of apples in equal units of 3kg.  
Here it is important to bear in mind that the only good reason you can have to 
think that a hidden language is possible is that you take yourself to speak one. Ultimately, 
then, my claim is that in you – assuming you believe private (and hence hidden) language 
to be possible – the capacity to perform one kind of speech act is logically inseparable 
from the capacity to perform more than one kind of speech act (which one exactly does 
not matter to my argument). But presumably you take yourself in fact to have the ability 
to perform various kinds of speech acts in every language you use, hidden or public. But 
then you must admit that it is logically possible for you to perform various kinds of 
speech acts in your supposedly hidden language. And if this is logically possible for you, 
then it is necessarily logically possible for you, such being the nature of logical 
possibility. (If you have capacity x in some possible world, then it is true in every 
possible world that you have x in some possible world). Therefore, anyone who thinks a 
private language is possible must agree that he himself has the capacity to perform 
different kinds of hidden speech acts.  
 
If it is possible to use a language to perform different kinds of speech acts, then the 
language must have an appropriate connection with the public life of its speaker. The 
idea is that every speech act is connected with some physiological dispositions of its user. 
One cannot possibly have different kinds of speech acts unless the difference is grounded 
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in public behaviour or dispositions to engage in public behaviour. The question is what 
counts as an appropriate connection between the different kinds of speech acts and the 
dispositions of the person who performs them to behave. What fact(s) about the 
dispositions of a speaker to behave is appropriate to an assertion or a question?   
Take the following propositionally identical speech acts: (i) I promise that p; (ii) I 
assert that p; (iii) I assume that p; and (iv) I ask whether p. The differences in these 
different kinds of speech act must ultimately be grounded in differences in the non-
linguistic public behaviour, or dispositions to behave, of the speaker. Although the 
speech acts share the same proposition, say, the proposition that the pedestrian light is 
green, they necessarily differ in their corresponding non-linguistic public correlates. 
Suppose, for instance, that Jack, Jill and John sincerely and genuinely perform any of (i), 
(ii), (iii) & (iv). And suppose that we know for certain that Jack and Jill perform (ii) & 
(iv), respectively; Jack asserts that, and Jill questions whether the pedestrian light is 
green. But we do not know the speech act that John performs. The public lives of both 
Jack and Jill will differ significantly; the one (a) crosses the street (or is so disposed), 
while the other (b) checks out (or is disposed to ascertain) whether the light is green.  
(a) and (b) are distinct public events of the sort that ground the differences in the 
different kinds of public speech acts of a speaker. But the essential thing about them is 
that they are non-linguistic. In order to differentiate between different kinds of speech 
acts, the differences must ultimately be grounded in behaviour or dispositions that are 
non-linguistic. Behaviour is “non-linguistic” if it does not involve actual linguistic 
behaviour or the capacity to engage in linguistic behaviour.   
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The line between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour can be further 
underscored thus: Speech-acts foist a linguistic and cognitive burden on the speaker, and 
performing a specific type of speech-act counts as the undertaking of that burden. 
Suppose I assert that p. In doing so, I undertake a certain linguistic or cognitive 
commitment that must be discharged, which is to behave as if p or behave as if I believe 
that p and to defend the truth of p if challenged. But making further assertions or other 
forms of speech-acts cannot by itself do the job, since these involve the undertaking of 
further commitments. Ultimately, the commitments one makes in performing the speech 
acts that one does must be discharged at the level of non-linguistic behaviour. You can 
pass the buck from one speech act to the next, but only so far before the buck must stop 
in your non-linguistic way of life.    
Now, let us relate this discussion to (a) and (b) above: Asserting that the light is 
green commits Jack to defending the claim that the light is green, if this claim is 
challenged; and asking whether the light is green commits Jill to paying attention to 
evidence that bears on the question whether it is green. Thus, Jack and Jill undertake 
different cognitive commitments. The way to discharge their respective commitments is 
not just by making further speech acts. It is to act (or be prepared to act) in certain ways.  
But, as we have seen, a private language proponent must deny that a language 
used in private has any connections at all with the public life of its user. But how else can 
one possibly distinguish between the different kinds of speech acts performed with a 
private, and therefore hidden language, if not by reference to the acts’ different 
connections with the public life of the individual who performs them?  Evidently, the 
differences must be grounded in the private life of the person who performs the hidden 
 73
speech acts. The question is whether there could be any such thing as a private behaviour 
or private disposition to behave, and what kind of connection there could be between 
private speech acts and private behaviour such as to ground differences in the different 
kinds of private speech acts.   
A hidden behaviour would have to be a form of mental behaviour. But then, how 
can one’s mental behaviour possibly fix the difference between, say, a hidden protest, 
“But No! I feel pain!” and a hidden promise, “When next I feel pain, I must try not to 
dwell on it!” One might say that in one case, there is puzzlement (at the mismatch 
between one’s belief and what is asserted), and, in the other, there is anticipation and 
resolve to fulfil the promise. But the question now arises what it is about one’s mental 
behaviour that constitutes puzzlement or anticipation or resolve. So far, we are nowhere 
nearer to saying what distinguishes a hidden assertion from a hidden promise. Attempting 
to ground the differences among different kinds of hidden speech acts in different 
propensities to make further speech acts can only lead to an infinite regress. 
In order to make hidden use of language, it must be possible to make different 
kinds of hidden speech acts. But any difference between two kinds of hidden speech acts 
must be grounded in the connections between those kinds of speech acts and the 
speaker’s hidden behaviour. Yet, the only sort of behaviour that might qualify as hidden 
is itself linguistic behaviour or else mental behaviour that presupposes linguistic 
behaviour on the part of whoever engages in it. It is impossible to break out of the 
linguistic circle while remaining inside the hidden realm: the buck gets passed on forever, 
from speech act to speech act, and we never arrive at any answer to the question of what 
makes one kind of hidden speech act different from another.  
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This point bears emphasis. First, we differentiate performance of a mental act 
from other mental events, such as the having of pain, the seeing of blue, and suchlike, 
which are not acts but mere experiences. Second, we identify the different kinds of 
mental acts there are: making a decision, forming a belief, posing a question, etc. One 
might suppose then that differences in the different kinds of hidden speech acts can be 
grounded in the performance of these mental acts. But not so; these acts presuppose the 
performance of actual hidden speech acts, or at least the theoretical possibility of such 
performance. For, making a decision presupposes the possibility of asserting to oneself ‘I 
will do so-and-so’; and forming a belief presupposes the possibility of asserting to 
oneself ‘It is the case that so-and-so’; and, lastly, wondering presupposes the possibility 
of posing to oneself a question: ‘Is it the case that so-or-so?’      
What is required is something that is distinct from any linguistic and cognitive 
expressions, and that is also not assimilable to any such forms. Since it is hopeless trying 
to ground different kinds of hidden speech acts in different kinds of hidden mental acts, 
the critic might try to ground the differences between them in different kinds of mental 
events that are not acts. That is, if hidden mental acts cannot provide a basis for 
differentiating among different kinds of inner speech acts, perhaps hidden sensations can 
pull off the trick. Asking myself a private question, for instance, might make me recall a 
past pain or tickle, in order to compare it with what I have now. I now place both 
sensations (the past sensation and the current one) side-by-side in my mind, and then, 
concentrate my attention on the sensations, one after the other, in quick succession.  
But wait. Since the sensations are so presented to me, and as I swing my attention 
back and forth, must I not be able to assert to myself, say, “this is a pain feeling”, “this is 
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a tickle” or “what I have now is more of a pain than a tickle”, and so on? That is, mustn’t 
I be capable of forming beliefs about the sensations and making assertions about them? 
So it seems. In that case, the idea of using facts about non-active mental states to fix the 
differences between the different kinds of hidden speech acts fails again. Raw sensations 
and phenomenal states cannot occur unaccompanied by judgements on the part of 
whoever has them – at least, this is true of the sensations that occur in a private linguist, 
which is the case that interests us here. Or if the avowed private linguist’s sensations do 
occur unaccompanied by judgements on the part to the effect that he is having them, that 
they are of a particular quality, or that they compare in particular ways to other sensations 
he has had, the sensations at any rate cannot occur absent a capacity on the part of the 
person who has them to form such judgements. This capacity in turn presupposes the 
possibility of making various kinds of hidden speech acts about the sensations. Once 
again, the attempt to find a basis for differences among various kinds of hidden speech 
acts goes in a circle.   
One might ask why the attempt at grounding the differences in the different kinds 
of hidden speech acts continues to fail. Perhaps there is an answer in Wittgenstein’s claim 
that all our (public) linguistic interactions are grounded in some behaviour or disposition 
to behave, in our characteristic way of acting, and so on. And that a way of acting 
constitutes the bedrock of all language games. For us public linguists, we are saved the 
trouble of having to fix the differences between one way of using a linguistic expression 
and another by appealing to yet another linguistic utterance, and having to fix the 
differences between the previous different ways of using an expression and the new one 
by appealing to yet another linguistic expression, ad infinitum. But in the case of a 
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putative private linguist, it is impossible to escape the vicious circle. The attempt to 
ground the differences between supposedly private linguistic speech acts expressions, as 
we have seen, in some form of private behaviour, yields another private speech act, and 
yet another, and so on. It seems impossible to arrive at that behaviour-bedrock in which a 
private speech act might be grounded.52  
A defender of private language has one last option. He might argue that the 
differences between different kinds of private speech acts need no fixing, that the 
capacity to differentiate one from the other is but a brute fact. It is a brute fact that one 
kind of private speech act, say, a private question, is distinct from another kind, such as 
an assertion. The differences between them require no explanation or account, and need 
no grounding whatsoever, let alone a grounding in any form of mental act or state. It is 
perhaps unfortunate that one is unable to specify the differences between different forms 
of private speech acts other than just by judging that they are different; but the fact that 
one is unable to do so does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that the differences do 
not exist.    
However, this is a desperate move and it is pretty ineffectual. How can the 
existence of a difference between a private assertion and a private question or command 
be a brute fact? To call it a brute fact is to say that it is a difference that does not reduce 
to anything more basic. Perhaps the difference between space and time is like this, or the 
difference between possibility and impossibility. It makes sense to posit a brute 
difference only between distinct fundamental entities, but not between things like 
different speech acts.  
                                                 
52 This, however, is not to support the idea that the possibility of a private language would be a counter-
example to some of Wittgensteinian claims about the role of language games in linguistic meaning.   
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If a language has an appropriate connection with the public life of its speaker, then 
someone besides its speaker can know the language exists. I argued earlier that if 
someone distinct from the speaker of a private language, i.e., the audience, can know that 
a language, L, exists, then she (the audience) can have public evidence about the speaker, 
that tells her (the audience) that L exists. (cf. chap. two, section I) The question is 
whether the reverse is also true: if L has an appropriate connection with the public life of 
the speaker (that, at least in theory, the audience can have) then the audience can know 
that L exists. I think this is logically possible if the audience becomes aware of the 
accompanying public events relevant to the speaker of L. I do not think the proponent of 
the possibility of a hidden language can put up much defence here. The person lost the 
battle at premise 2. The crux of the claim that a language whose words can be used in 
private, independently of any public sensation-behaviour, i.e., in being known to exist 
only to its user, has been shown at premise 2 to be unintelligible. The best that the critic 
can offer here is a rehash of the arguments which have been considered earlier and 
rejected. Thus, premise 3 is but an academic exercise; inconsequential. 
If a language is connected with its speaker’s public life, then its speaker can make 
the existence of the language known to someone else by telling them that he uses a 
language that correlates in such-and-such ways to his public life.    
In defending the idea that the audience can know the speaker’s language, L, 
exists, if L has an appropriate connection with the public life of the speaker, I do not 
claim that public behaviour or dispositions to engage in public behaviour implicate a 
such-and-such private linguistic or cognitive state. The point strictly is that someone 
distinct from the speaker of L can know L exists if L has an appropriate connection with 
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the public life of its speaker, whatever the event might be. Neither does it make any 
difference whether or not the user of L is aware of the event, since it can otherwise be 
brought to his notice. (cf. Chap. Two, I) 
We can imagine a situation in which someone besides the speaker of L raises a 
question to the speaker, “why does your ear lobe twitch?” or “what happens when your 
ear lobe twitches?” The speaker can then use this aspect of his public life to tell the 
audience he uses a language that connects in such-and-such a way to his twitching ear 
lobe. Once this connection is made, the rest is history. The important point is that the 
speaker can explain to the audience his words of L by leveraging on facts about his public 
nature. It is no use to object that the audience cannot fully understand the speaker’s words 
of L. As I argued earlier, it is possible for multiple people who use a word to refer to a 
sensation to have full understanding of that word given that the sensation the word refers 




I have shown (a) for any language, L, if only its speaker can understand L, then only its 
speaker can know L exists. I have also shown (b) for any language, L, if only its speaker 
can know L exists, then its speaker cannot use L to say anything to him or herself. A 
speaker can use a language only if someone distinct from the speaker can know the 
language exists. But this is incompatible with the possibility of a private language. It 
follows that a private language is impossible.  
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The next question is what implications the impossibility of a private language 
might have for other areas of philosophy. But before I answer this question, I should like 
to consider the second conception of the task of a putative private linguist, i.e., the 





















II. Alternative Interpretations of the PLA  
   
The PLA literature is replete with commentaries driven by the assumption that what is 
logically impossible (or possible) – about a hypothetical private language – is for the 
supposed private linguist to set up a language that can be understood by no one else but 
the speaker.53 Nonetheless, there is a sharp disagreement amongst the proponents of this 
view about the details of that impossibility (or otherwise). This disagreement can be seen 
in the responses to the following general argument: 
 
1. If a private language is possible, then the speaker can name his or her sensations (PI 
§256).  
 
2. But in order to name his or her sensations, the speaker must exist in a linguistic 
scenario; i.e., doing so involves a social language-game or stage-setting (PI §257), or 
requires a definition someone else understands (PI §258, cf. PI §28ff.), or rules that at 
least someone other than its speaker follows (PI §§198-202).   
 
3. So a private language is impossible.  
 
                                                 




The two premises of this argument have been main centres of controversy in the current 
PLA literature. I explain both premises briefly in order to spell out the points of tension.54   
Premise (1) states a plausible linguistic prerequisite for the existence of a private 
language. The controversial premise of the argument is (2). This is the actual test of the 
possibility or impossibility of the supposed private linguist’s task, i.e., whether he or she 
can possibly set up the so-called private language. The question here is whether the 
setting up of a language requires following rules that someone else could be taught to 
follow; or using a definition that someone else could be made to understand; or playing a 
language game that someone else could play. Indeed, some commentators maintain that 
the actual existence of another role-playing individual is necessary for setting up a 
language. On this view, not only is a logically private language impossible—so even is a 
contingently solitary language spoken by someone who lives his whole life in the absence 
of any other language users.   
The two premises correspond roughly to two alternative interpretations of the 
private language argument, respectively. The first one (II.1.) states that if it is possible to 
talk about a private language, then it does not exist. The second interpretation (II.2.) 
contends that a person cannot speak a private language unless he invents it, and he cannot 
invent one, so, a private language is impossible.55   
I now discuss the two interpretations in detail.    
 
 
                                                 
54 I do not intend to settle the controversies, either way, but to simply emphasize some of the issues they 
raise.  
 
55 These may not exhaust all possible interpretations of the private language argument, but I believe they 
are representative of the dominant ones given the current state of the literature.  
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II.1. If we can talk about it, it does not exist  
 
According to this interpretation, in order to speak a private language, it is necessary that 
you not speak a public language. But if that is true, then anyone who claims to speak a 
private language in the midst of a philosophical debate is refuted by his own words. Dorit 
Bar-On argues along similar lines: “[T]he private diarist of Philosophical Investigations 
#258 is already a proficient user of linguistic signs asking whether he could set up a new 
sign—or even a system of signs—to stand for his private sensations.”56 Here, Bar-On’s 
private diarist is supposed to be Wittgenstein’s private linguist. Though Bar-On goes on 
to draw other implications from “#258”, I limit my comments here to what she thinks this 
means for the putative private linguist.  
Here Bar-On asserts that the private diarist (i.e., the would-be private linguist) 
already possesses a public language. What follows from this reading, according to Bar-
On, is a dilemma: “Either the diarist could not manage to set up a practice involving the 
marks like ‘S’ and his private sensations which would qualify as a language, or the 
language he manages to set up would not be private—it would be parasitic upon the 
diarist’s public language.”57 What seems to follow from this dilemma is that it is 
impossible for someone to set up a private language if the person already possesses a 
public one, as the case of the private diarist shows.  
                                                 
56 Dorit Bar-On, “On the Possibility of a Solitary Language,” Nous 26, 1 (1992): 28. She poses the dilemma 
as a basis of comparison between the predicaments of both the private linguist and a Super-Crusoe, i.e., a 
lifelong solitary person. But this dilemma thrives on the assumption that possession of a public language is 
inconsistent with a putative private language.      
 
57 Dorit Bar-On, ibid., 28.  
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Either the would-be private linguist has a public language or does not. If the 
person does, we cannot guarantee the (supposed) new language to be private, and if 
otherwise, there can be no language at all, let alone one that no one else can possibly 
understand. Either way, a private language is impossible.  
This result is bad news for the debate on the interpretation of the private language 
argument. For it makes a putative private language impossible ab initio—in being either a 
language the question of whose possibility cannot be raised or a language one cannot 
possibly make sense of. My concerns here can be sorted out into two main objections 
against Bar-On. Bar-On assumes, falsely, that in order for a person to have a private 
language, the person must set up a private language. She also assumes, falsely, that 
having a private language is incompatible with having a public language, or rather, that 
both private and public uses of a language are inconsistent. As, I argued earlier, speaking 
a private language is consistent with speaking a public language, provided that the 
speaker of the private language is the only person who can know that he speaks the 










II.2. You can’t speak a private language unless you invent it 
   
This I think is the standard interpretation of the private language argument.  This is where 
the question, once raised, is addressed, and where the bulk of the existing private 
language controversy is argued pro and con. The controversies are multilayered. At one 
level, there are different kinds of positions regarding the setting up of a supposed private 
language. The positions centre on themes such as ‘rule-following’, ‘private ostension’, 
‘verificationism/scepticism about memory’, ‘stage-setting/language-game’, and suchlike. 
Of these themes, ‘rule-following’, arguably, has received the most attention.58 (At a 
much lower level, there are internal debates among scholars whose views differ in details 
even though they share similar broad positions).59  
                                                
The most significant controversies are regarding Wittgenstein’s view about the 
supposedly social nature of language. The community-view vs. the individualist debate, 
as it is commonly referred to, stems from the can/does or the weak/strong readings, of 
certain sections of the Philosophical Investigations. I will explain what these distinctions 
amount to later. The rule-related controversy, I believe, has had the most influence, and it 
 
58 These commentators include: Kripke: 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language; Blackburn, 
“Rule-Following and Moral Realism” (1981), and ‘The Individual Strikes Back’ (1984),  reprinted in 
Essays in Quasi Realism (1993); Wright, Rails to Infinity, (2001); McDowell, ‘Wittgenstein on Following a 
Rule’ (1984), reprinted in Mind, Value, and Reality (1998); McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (1984); 
Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden (1986), etc. 
  
59 For some of these internal controversies, see (i) Blackburn’s (1981) critique of McDowell’s (1981); (ii) 
McDowell’s (1984) response to Blackburn (1981, 1984) and his critique of Crispin Wright’s Wittgenstein 
on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980);  and (iii) Crispin 
Wright’s “Rule Following, Meaning and Constructivism,” in Meaning and Interpretation, edited by C. 
Travis, 271-297 (Oxford; N. Y.: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), reprinted in his “Rails to Infinity”, 53-89, 
reply to McDowell’s (1984). All the authors mentioned here disagree with Kripke’s (1982) sceptical 
reading of the rule-following interpretation.  
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is on rule-related variants of the “you can’t speak a private language unless you invent it” 
interpretation of the private language argument that I shall focus here.60  
 
II.2.A. ‘Rule-following’ and the community-view vs. individualist debate 
 
Behind the ‘rule-following’ interpretation is the idea that rules are fundamental to 
language, and that intelligible use of it is impossible unless the rules are followed. On this 
interpretation, the impossibility of private language is supposed to follow from the 
ostensible impossibility of private-rule following.  
The proponents of the rule-following interpretation rely primarily on PI §§198, 
201, and 202. But they disagree on what it means to speak of “following a rule in 
private.” Does it mean that only one person can follow a rule, or that only one person 
does follow it? Thus, one main question arising from the rule-following reading is: Does 
the rule-following thesis commit Wittgenstein to a (strong) social basis for language? Is 
following a rule II.2.A.i something only a member of a community does, or, II.2.A.ii 
something only a member of a community can do?61  
                                                 
60 For discussions on the other readings of the private language argument, see: on ‘stage-setting/language-
game’, e.g., Hintikka, On Wittgenstein; on the ‘impossibility of private ostension’, e.g., Stern, “A new 
exposition of the ‘private language argument’”, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’; Kenny, 
Wittgenstein; Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, etc. With the exception of Stern, others do not 
(clearly) fall in the category of the ‘alternative language theorists’.  
 
61 It is in this sense that the question might arise: what the implication might be, either way, for a solitary 
speaker (i.e., a lifelong Robinson Crusoe; a ‘pure Robinson Crusoe’, Donald Davidson; a person isolated 
from birth; ‘a Super-Crusoe’, David Pears, cited by Dorit Bar-On; ‘a person considered in isolation’, 
Kripke; ‘a Simple Crusoe’, J.V. Canfield). Some of the commentators who hold (II.2.A.i) are Malcolm, 
Nothing is Hidden; Pears, The False Prison (1988); ‘The structure of the Private language Argument,’ 
(1989); McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality chap. 11, etc.; those who hold (II.2.A.ii) include Baker and 
Hacker, “On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein”, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning; McGinn, 
Wittgenstein on Meaning; Blackburn, Essays on Quasi-Realism, chap. 12, and arguably, Kripke, 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), etc.  
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Let us discuss these readings in turn, using McDowell and McGinn, respectively, 
as guides.62 
 
II.2.A.i The community view  
 
The general frame of McDowell’s rule-following interpretation of the private language 
argument may be stated thus: 
 
1. A language cannot exist unless there are rules for how to use it. 
2. A rule (for how to use a language) cannot exist unless more than one person 
does follow it.  
 
3. Therefore, a language cannot exist unless there are rules for how to use it that 
more than one person does follow.   
 
                                                 
62 See, McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality chap. 11, and McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning. 
 
 87
From the foregoing, premise (1) is clearly true, but (2) is controversial. This is a question 
about the interpretation of ‘following a rule’.63 McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein's 
argument for the premise is familiar: 
D1. To follow a rule is to grasp a rule in a way which is not an interpretation.64 
 
D2. Grasping a rule in a way which is not an interpretation is to make a practice of 
obeying the rule.65 
 
D3. Thus, following a rule is to make a practice of obeying the rule.  
 
To follow a rule is not merely to interpret that rule, or to make a judgement about what 
the rule entails. Here McDowell calls on Wittgenstein: “[A]ny interpretation still hangs in 
the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support.” (PI §198) 
Wittgenstein motivates this claim in various ways, including with his examples of the 
pointing arrow and the fore-finger. Imagine, for instance, the familiar sign made with a 
clenched fist that has the fore and the middle fingers pointing upward—commonly 
                                                 
63 Malcolm shares the view that Wittgenstein’s point about ‘following a rule’ is that one does not have to 
rely on an interpretation of a rule in order to understand it, and also works his way, independently, to a 
similar conclusion that following a rule is to act in accord with the way the community acts by the rule. The 
argument by which he arrives at that conclusion can be summarised thus: “What fixes the meaning of a rule 
is our customary way of applying the rule in particular cases. There is a way of acting that we call 
‘following the rule’. Indefinitely many other ways of acting are possible: but we do not call them 
‘following the rule’.” (p. 155) ‘We’ in this sense refers to the community of users. It is the community of 
users that not only fixes the correct way of ‘following the rule’ but also ensures that the rules are followed. 
In the absence of this agreement, “there would be no ‘going by a sign-post’: ‘a person goes by a sign-post 
only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.’ (PI 198) […] . This means that the 
concept of following a rule implies the concept of a community of rule-followers. (p. 156)” See his 
“Nothing is Hidden,” 155-158. 
 
64 McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality, 229-30., cf. PI §201.  
 
65 Ibid., 238-39, cf. PI §202, §198.  
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referred to as the V-sign, for victory. What constitutes the rule-following in 
understanding the meaning of this sign? It is not simply (just, merely) by interpreting the 
shape of the fingers as a ‘V,’ and ‘V’, in turn, as the first letter of the word ‘victory’. For 
such interpretations will have to depend on further interpretations, one after the other; 
say, the interpretation of ‘victory’ which will also rest on the interpretation of the words 
people use to explain what they mean by ‘victory,’ and so on. In order words, premise D1 
is mostly uncontroversial, excepting on the sceptical reading “as it strikes Kripke”, which 
attributes the following problem to Wittgenstein: it is impossible for us to know the 
meaning of any word, if the meaning of a word depends on the rules that govern its use. 
For any use of a word can conform to different possible rules. There can be no fact of my 
being faithful to any previous rule I have grasped in any of its future applications. Hence, 
it seems, grasping a rule is always an interpretation.66 In light of PI §201, McDowell 
avers correctly: “The right response to the paradox, Wittgenstein in effect tells us, is not 
to accept it but to correct the misunderstanding on which it depends: that is, to realize 
“that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.””67 
The question, therefore, is what way of following a rule is not an interpretation? 
In this regard, premise D2 is controversial. McDowell appeals to familiar passages: “I 
think the thesis that obeying a rule is a practice is meant to constitute the answer to this 
                                                 
66 For Kripke’s sceptical reading, see “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”. Kripke’s work has 
been very influential in the secondary literature. However, the sceptical reading of ‘rule following’ has met 
with popular disfavour.  
 
67 McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, 229. On this point, the disputants agree. McGinn (on the other side 
of the present divide), for instance, concurs: “[G]rasping a rule is not interpreting it, in the sense of 
translating it into another sign; it is rather that which we exhibit when we apply the rule.” See, McGinn, 
Wittgenstein on Meaning, p. 43, and cf. n. 43.  
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question.”68 He argues further: “When I follow a sign-post, the connection between it and 
my action is not mediated by an interpretation of sign-posts that I acquired when I was 
trained in their use. I simply act as I have been trained to.”69  
But here an objection might be raised against McDowell’s reading of 
Wittgenstein. There is a difference between an account of what causes the going by sign-
posts and that of what going by the sign post is. How can one tell that the training so 
described is not about the former? In the following, as well as in the above quote, 
McDowell gets to the heart of the controversy—he adumbrates his community-view 
reading of premise D2: “The reply—which corresponds to the first sentence of §202—is 
that the training in question is initiation into a custom.”70 The phrase ‘initiation into’ 
suggests the existence of a pre-existing community practice. A similar suggestion is made 
by Wittgenstein at PI §§198: “I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, 
and now I do so react to it.” Yet again at PI §190: “What is the criterion for the way the 
formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are 
taught to use it.”   
But let us quickly follow the defence of his reading of the remark on training 
through, in light of the objection raised in the paragraph above, before returning to the 
controversy about D2. There is no mediation (either in terms of a causal explanation or an 
interpretation) between my following a rule and the actions that constitute my following 
that rule—““I obey the rule blindly” (PI §219).” This, of course, is not to endorse an 
                                                 
68 McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, 238, cf. PI §202.  
 
69 Ibid., 239, cf. PI §§198. 
 
70 Ibid.  
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‘absent-minded’ or ‘irrational’ way of carrying out a rule, but to make a logical point. 
And the point is that one obeys a rule “blindly” where the use of a particular expression is 
such that the justifications for it have been exhausted. McDowell supports this reasoning 
with the following remark:   
 
How do I know that the colour I am now seeing is called “green”? […]. 
If I am drowning and I shout “Help!”, how do I know what the word Help 
means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation.—Now that is how I know what 
“green” means as well and also know how I have to follow the rule in the 
particular case.71       
 
Following a rule is an established, regular way of doing things, a form of life. 
 
Now back to the controversy. McDowell reads Wittgenstein’s expressions, such 
as, ‘training’, ‘going by sign-posts’, ‘a custom’, etc., to support a community-view. The 
upshot of the claim that, in being trained to follow a rule, an individual ‘is initiated into a 
custom’ is this: for the person to understand—and not merely interpret—the meaning of a 
word, or the use of an expression, he or she must belong to a linguistic community. (My 
emphasis) That is, it would take someone who belongs to a community of people whose 
members use similar words, e.g., ‘victory’, in ways that tie-in to similar public behaviour 
to understand the meaning of not only that word, but presumably also of the fingers-on-
fist V-sign when it is used to denote victory. For McDowell, sharing a language is not 
                                                 
71 Wittgenstein: Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, VI-35, cited by McDowell, Mind, Value, & 
Reality, p. 240.  
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merely a condition in which an aggregate of individuals are in accord “in their 
dispositions to linguistic behaviour, […] without drawing on command of the language, 
and hence not in terms of the contents of their utterances.”72 Rather, it requires that as a 
people we are bound together in being able to “make our minds available to one another, 
by confronting one another with a different exterior from that which we present to 
outsiders.”73 
Thus, ‘following a rule’ is only possible within the context of a linguistic 
community whose shared membership is characterised by the ability of all of its members 
to reveal their thought, to one another through regularities in their linguistic behaviour. 
The question is why it is not possible for the regularities in the linguistic behaviour of an 
individual (considered in isolation) to constitute the kind of practice that could provide 
interpretation-free understanding. One might ask, according to McDowell: “if the concept 
of a communal practice can magic meaning into our picture, should not this power be 
credited to the concept of a practice as such—so that the practice of an individual might 
serve just as well?” But, he would insist, in order for a practice to manifest 
understanding, “it is precisely the notion of a communal practice that is needed, not some 
notion that could equally be applied outside the context of a community.”74 But is this 
really so? For a possible answer, we can now proceed to a rival view. 
 
                                                 
72 McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality, p. 249. This is his grouse with ‘anti-realism’, and with Wright, in 
particular, for his – according to McDowell – anti-realist construal of ‘following a rule’. But as I have 
already indicated above (see n. 60), this confrontation is an internal controversy, which I do not intend to 
pursue here.   
 
73 McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality, p. 253.  
 
74 McDowell, Mind, Value, & Reality, p. 254. 
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II.2.A.ii  The individual or anti-community view75  
 
McGinn's argument for this view can be presented analogously to McDowell’s, by 
replacing the word "does" as it occurs in McDowell’s argument with the word "can":  
 
G1. A language cannot exist unless there are rules for how to use it.  
 
G2. A rule (for how to use a language) cannot exist unless more than one person can 
follow it.  
 
G3. Therefore, a language cannot exist unless there are rules for how to use it that 
more than one person can follow.   
 
 McGinn’s interpretation of ‘following a rule’ is apparent in his defence of premise 
G2. His reading conflicts with McDowell’s; since, it allows the theoretical possibility for 
the linguistic behaviour of a communityless individual to ground rules of the sort that G1 
and D1 say are necessary for language. The important thing about rules for McGinn is not 
that they take place in a community setting, but that: “[R]ule-following takes place in the 
                                                 
75 For another interesting (exegetic) version of this reading, see, Backer, and Hacker: Wittgenstein: Rules, 
Grammar and Necessity, chap. III & IV; Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, chap. 1; Wittgenstein: 
Connections and Controversies, chaps. 10 and 11. Although, I do not join the debate on whether 
Wittgenstein should be read communally or individualistically, the interpretation of the private language 
argument that I defend in this thesis – that it is not possible for anyone to use a language that no one except 
its speaker could possibly know exists – favours a version of the latter view, i.e., there cannot possibly be a 
language someone speaks that no one else in principle can know to exist, and understand, even if the 
language happens to be known to exist and is understood by only one person.  
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sphere of actual behaviour and not in the inner recesses of a person’s consciousness or 
mental mechanism.”76    
 McGinn’s argument for G2 runs thus: 
 
1) If there can be a linguistic rule that only one person can possibly follow, then no 
one can tell whether the rule actually gets followed unless that one person can tell. 
 
2) The only way that the one person who can (supposedly) follow such a private rule 
can tell whether the rule is actually followed is for that person to have fallible 
self-knowledge of that ability. 
 
3) But it is not possible for the one person (who follows a private rule) to have 
fallible self-knowledge of his or her ability.         
 
3`) It is not possible for the one person (who follows a private rule) to have fallible 
self-knowledge of his or her ability to repeatedly apply sensation words with the 
same meaning.     
 
4) It follows that the one person who supposedly follows a private rule can't tell 
whether he or she actually follows it. 2), 3) & 3`)   
 
                                                 
76 McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 36.  
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5) It follows that no one can tell whether any rule that is privately followed 
actually gets followed. 1), 4)  
 
6) But if no one can tell whether any private rule gets followed, then it is 
inadmissible to suppose that any such rule ever does get followed. 
 
7) Therefore, it is inadmissible to suppose that there is a rule that just one person 
can follow.  5), 6) 
 
McGinn’s ‘can’ reading of ‘following a rule’ rests on a principle of fallibility. On 
McGinn’s reading, the principle is grounded in the actual practice of the person who is 
(supposedly) following the rule. The issue for him is how the existence of a public (even 
if solitary) practice might enable the purported rule-follower to establish a difference 
between ways of acting that accord with the rule and ways that do not. The point to start 
with is: for anyone to understand the meaning of a word, or grasp a rule, it must be 
possible to specify in just what cases the person acts in accord with that rule or fails so to 
act. But, according to McGinn, it is impossible to specify this unless it is possible for 
more than one person to know whether the rule is being followed.77  
Someone might claim to possess the ability to follow a linguistic rule that no one 
else can possibly follow. In this case, no one except the individual can tell that the 
putative rule is actually being followed, since the ability to tell whether a linguistic rule is 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 43. 
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being followed presupposes comprehension of the rule, and therefore at least the logical 
possibility of following it oneself. Premise 1) is therefore not controversial. 
  For premise 2), the only way that the one person who can follow such a private 
linguistic rule can tell whether the rule is actually followed is for that person to have 
fallible self-knowledge of the ability. Someone who can follow a rule that only he can tell 
whether it actually gets followed can only do so if the person can have fallible self-
knowledge of that ability. In that case, the one person could only rely on the possibility of 
having introspective access to his ability to tell whether a rule actually gets followed. 
That is, he could only rely on “the conception of rule-following as possession of private 
act of consciousness”.78 The person can only appeal to a private model of “obeying a 
rule”.   
The thrust of 3) is that it is impossible for abilities to be known by introspection. 
Here McGinn draws a distinction between self-ascriptions of phenomenal experience, on 
the one hand, and self-ascription of acts of understanding, on the other. The one can be 
seen as a mental/inner process; but the other, only as ability. According to McGinn, “self-
ascriptions of conscious states, e.g., of mental images, are not fallible - or at least not 
fallible in the way self-ascriptions of understanding are fallible.”79 That is, it is 
impossible for someone to have a pain experience but nevertheless to believe he or she 
does not have a pain experience while the experience lasts. But it is not possible to talk 
about understanding on this model. Why? Understanding is, necessarily, a capacity; it is 
fallible. ‘I believe that I see red’ is categorially different from ‘I can tell red from blue’. 
                                                 





The one is a self-ascription of a phenomenal experience, and is infallible; but the other is 
a self-ascription of a capacity—an ability to do something—and is fallible. It is perfectly 
possible for one to think that one possesses the ability, say, to ride a bicycle, or to match 
or separate colours but nevertheless be unable to do so.    
All this, according to McGinn, shows that 
 
[T]he conception of rule-following as a private act of consciousness, logically 
independent of what one goes on to do, gets the epistemology of self-ascriptions 
of rule-following wrong: it cannot register, or make room for, the fact that we can 
be mistaken when we take ourselves to be exercising mastery of a rule.80   
 
There are at least two problems arising from premise 3), one of which I will raise 
now. This has to do with the modal status of McGinn’s claim that self-ascriptions of 
conscious states are not fallible. There is a distinction between logical and natural 
infallibility of introspective belief about phenomenal experience. Though the latter meets 
with very little disagreement; the other is widely contended. It is not immediately clear 
which view McGinn intends to defend. The closest one gets to placing McGinn’s view is 
where he claims that conscious states “are not fallible – or at least not fallible in the way 
self-ascriptions of understanding are fallible.”81 Is McGinn admitting to a weaker—
natural (?)—sense of infallibility? Perhaps yes; but a more charitable view might be that 
the concept of fallibility as it applies to introspective beliefs about conscious states—
                                                 
80 Ibid.   
 
81 Ibid.   
 
 97
roughly put, the logical possibility of having a mistaken belief about one’s conscious 
experience, say, pain82—is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Speaking for McGinn, the 
question of fallibility as it arises for introspection is whether or not someone can possibly 
have a mistaken belief about his or her phenomenal experience. But the question of 
fallibility as it arises for a person’s self-knowledge of his or her ability is something else; 
it is about the person’s ability to establish a difference between actually understanding 
and merely thinking he understands. This is McGinn’s point.    
The other problem with premise 3) arises due to the application of the fallibility 
thesis—the thesis that self-ascriptions of understanding are fallible, given that 
understanding is ability, and no ability can be known infallibly—to the language of 
sensation. As we shall see below, this raises the question of the fallibility of memory.    
In order to make McGinn’s claim in 3) about the impossibility of knowing ability 
infallibly bear more directly on a private language of sensation, we need to add 3`. But 
before I discuss 3`), the following points must be noted. First, ‘ability’ in 3`), and in 
reference to 2) should now be read as a recurrent use of the same private words as names 
of the sensations, but not as a skill whose self-ascriptions consist in doing something in 
public. Second, the sensation language user, whose self-ascriptions of conscious states 
McGinn claims above is infallible, is an ordinary sensation language user—one whose 
sensation-words can be understood by someone else.    
Now the thrust of 3`) is that the putative user of a private sensation name has no 
criterion by which to check that the sensation name is being used with the same meaning 
                                                 
82 Philosophers who hold this view argue that there is a temporal distinction between the having of 
experience and the forming of belief about the experience. See, for instance, Armstrong, A Materialist 
Theory of Mind, pp.104-07.  
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over time. But neither does anyone else have any criterion by which to check that the 
speaker does. For the speaker, there is “only an impression of constancy to go on, which 
does not itself entail that any rule is really being consistently followed”. And for the 
hearer, the possibility does not even arise; since the person “(ex hypothesis) […] cannot 
know what sensations the speaker has.”83   
The purported private linguist can only appeal to “apparent memories”, but these, 
at best, only yield an impression of constancy, which by itself cannot possibly establish 
the fact that the rule of applying a linguistic sign is “consistent” and “regular”. The hearer 
is even worse off; the person has nothing to appeal to. One can observe, physically, 
whether it is the same item that is being referred to by a particular word now and again 
“in the case of public physical objects”; but the hearer of a word whose referent is 
“unknowable” has no way of attesting the fallibility of its use. In the one case, the 
apparent criterion is inadequate; and in the other, none is available. Thus, in a private 
language scenario, “no criterion of semantic regularity is in use”.84  
But here McGinn runs the risk of proving too much. McGinn’s assumption is that 
one cannot appeal to his or her memory in order to check whether a private word is used 
consistently, whereas in the case of physical facts or objects: “the hearer can observe that 
it is the same (kind of) object that a word is being applied to over time”.  
                                                 
83 McGinn, Ibid., 48. The question might be raised whether the speaker’s predicament is about non 
possession of a criterion (which McGinn seems to favour), or whether it is about the unavailability of any 
criterion at all, by which to distinguish between the impression of going on, and really going on.  
Verheggen makes a similar point against Pears. See Verheggen, “Wittgenstein on ‘Languages”, 335-6.  
  
84McGinn, op. cit., 48.  
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This assumption has been widely criticized as follows.85 
 
Suppose I take a peek into my memory to check what was on the front page of the 
last edition of the Straits Times.  What exactly happens? I may recall the front page of the 
paper itself and consult with other people to confirm my memory impression. But that 
assumes that other people’s memory is reliable. I might otherwise check the library for a 
copy of the paper, but how do I know the paper in question, or that a particular paper is 
the same I saw earlier? Don’t I have to remember correctly that it is? One might take it 
for granted that the paper has not changed; it very probably has not. Nonetheless, that is 
no guarantee that it has not. The public facts which we use to corroborate our memory 
impressions of physical objects themselves depend on whether we remember them well. 
Ultimately, one still has to rely on the memory impression of the paper. It follows then 
that one is not justified to claim scepticism of the memory about sensation words 
anymore than one is about physical objects.  
  The constraint of checkability mentioned above weighs heavily on the putative 
private language user’s ability to establish a consistent use of sensation words to refer to 
similar sensations time after time. According to McGinn 6), without the ability to 
perform that check, it is inadmissible that there is nevertheless such a consistency. He 
argues: “[A]ny genuine language must refer only to things and properties whose 
presence can be publicly verified”.86  
                                                 
85 It is instructive to note that McGinn is not alone in this apparent appeal to the fallibility of memory. 
Other commentators include: David Pears, The False Prison, vol.  2. Chap.  13; It is in doubt whether such 
claim is useful as a basis of establishing the impossibility of a private language. See the following for an 
interesting critique of that view: Verheggen, “Wittgenstein and ‘Solitary’ Languages”. 
 
86 McGinn, op. cit., 48-9.  
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 McGinn recognises the verificationist assumption in this argument.87 However, 
this problem may not arise for a communitarian view, like McDowell’s. The linguistic 
behaviour of individual members of a linguistic community is but a brute fact; it does not 
bestow meaning on the words of a speaker, or understanding of an expression on its 
speaker, simply by its being “verifiable” by the others, but by ultimately drawing a line 
beyond which the speaker could no longer be asked for further justification. It is not 
merely a medium of legislating compliance (or non-compliance) with linguistic rules. 
The command of shared language avails the membership of the community, so to speak, 
a notion of how each person is to go on—everyone simply acts as the other does.  
So the question is not whether a verificationist assumption is acceptable; 
obviously, verificationism is out of favour. Rather, it is whether Wittgenstein is 
committed to such an interpretation. The general consensus, arguably, in the private 
language argument literature is that appeal to verification, or to scepticism about the 
memory, had better not be the reasons why a putative private language is impossible. My 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument has two advantages. The first 
is that it avoids the thorny question of whether a private language is impossible because 
the private linguist cannot check the correct application of his words. The second 
advantage is that it avoids the controversy about the reliability of the putative private 
linguist’s memory as a means to establish the constancy of his application of linguistic 
rules.    
                                                 
87 See McGinn, ibid., 48, n. 47. It is also instructive to note that McGinn is not alone in appealing to the 
verificationist principle. See Judith J. Thompson’s “Private Languages”: The paper argues that if the 
‘Private Language Argument puts forward any thesis as some commentators have argued (here Thompson 
is mainly concerned with Malcolm’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,” Philosophical Review, 
Vol. 63 (1954), it should be a restatement of the Principle of Verification.   
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In general, the two alternative variants of the interpretation of the private 
language argument in this sub-section provoke some interesting questions. Particularly, 
one wonders why the question of a private language is reduced to the question whether 
someone can invent the language. Hacker (with Baker) denies that the possibility of a 
private language turns, basically, on whether or not one can set up a language no one else 
can possibly understand. Following Wittgenstein, he argues that one can imagine human 
beings who speak in monologues, “so that their languages were never employed in 
interpersonal communication at all, but only in talking to themselves.”88 One might 
consider that “each person could even have his own language” and that they “are 
acquainted only with language-games which one plays by oneself.”89  
This idea, according to Hacker, is “not unintelligible”. So “How they might have 
learnt their private languages is irrelevant to an account of their linguistic capacity.”90  
Hacker admits that possibility of a private language, as Wittgenstein entertains it, 
is more difficult to accept than that of the monologists. But the important point is that, if 
the idea of someone popping into existence with a fully developed language is 
intelligible, why should we not be able to say the same in the case of a private language? 
Why can’t we assume that a being pops into existence with a full-blown private 
language? It sure seems like we can imagine a fully competent speaker of the English 
language popping into existence ex nihilo – so why not a fully competent speaker of a 
private language?  
                                                 
88 Hacker, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, 93. Hacker relies, especially, on MS 124, cf. PI §243.  
  
89 “MS. 124, 213ff.” cited by Hacker, ibid., 36.   
 
90 Ibid., 93, 36. cf. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, 282, n.22.  
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If as Hacker points out, “Wittgenstein countenances the logical possibility of 
creatures being born with the ability to speak a language (cf. PG 188; BB 12),”91 it seems 
therefore that Wittgenstein would reject the claim that you cannot speak a private 
language unless you invent it.  
As a recap, I have argued in this chapter that a hidden language is logically 
impossible. A hypothetical user of a hidden language – a language only its speaker can 
possibly know exists – cannot use the language to say anything to him or herself. The 
argument rested on a reading of the putative private linguist’s task – the possibility of the 
person to use a language in private – as I believe Wittgenstein understands it. I have 
argued also in this chapter that the arguments which follows from the alternative readings 
of the private linguist’s task – the possibility of the person to set up a language that is 
purportedly private – fail to offer any compelling reason to believe that there is any 
relevant connection between the setting up of a language and the logical impossibility of 
the language to be private to its speaker.   








                                                 
91 Hacker, Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, 282, n.22. 
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    Chapter Five 




I have shown that (and how) the private language argument establishes, as I believe 
Wittgenstein understands it, the impossibility of a language only the person who uses it 
could know exists. The question now is what might follow from this impossibility. On 
my reading, Wittgenstein’s remarks in the private language argument sections of the 
Philosophical Investigations show that a certain dualist thesis, i.e., dualism about 
sensation, is false. I argue that the impossibility of a private language implies that 
conscious states are physical.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. In part I, I offer an argument to the 
conclusion that consciousness is physical. In this argument, I use the impossibility of a 
private language to defend an argument for physicalism from dualist attack. In part II, I 
identify some evidence of Wittgenstein’s awareness of the mind/body debate. In part III, 
I justify attributing the psychophysical argument in (I) to Wittgenstein. In this respect, I 
explore some of his remarks in the relevant sections of the Investigations (and elsewhere) 
that bear on the nature of consciousness. Finally, in part IV, I discuss some of the 






I. An Argument for the Physical Character of Phenomenal Consciousness 
(APCP)  
 
In this section, I begin with a two-premise argument to the conclusion that phenomenal 
consciousness is physical. One of the argument’s premises is intuitive and relatively 
uncontroversial, although I will consider some objections to it. The other premise is less 
intuitive, and stands in need of some supporting argument. The argument I offer hinges 
on the claim that a private language is impossible.  
The argument is as follows:    
 
A1.  A person’s physical characteristics logically determine the truth-conditional 
contents of his introspective beliefs, including the beliefs he holds about his own 
sensations. 
 
A2.  The truth-conditional contents of a person’s introspective beliefs logically 
determine his phenomenology. (In the sense that his possessing the introspective 
beliefs he does logically entails that he has the phenomenology he has).  
 
A3.  Therefore, a person’s physical characteristics logically determine his 
phenomenology. (A1 & A2)  
 
In (A1), the claim is that there could not possibly be a difference in the cognitive status of 
someone’s introspection without a corresponding difference in the person’s physical 
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characteristics. And in (A2), it is that there could not be a difference in the quality of a 
person’s phenomenology without a corresponding difference in the status of the person’s 
introspective beliefs.  It is obvious that the APCP is valid. The question is whether it is 
sound. I attend to this immediately, first by considering the stronger premise (A1), and 
next, premise (A2).  
     
Premise A1. A belief is introspective if it is directed towards one’s own mental 
states; it is not about any events in the outside world. The belief I have about my own 
occurrent reddish experience is introspective in this sense. It is different from the belief I 
have about someone else’s mental states, or my belief that there is a red colour patch on 
the wall, which depends for its truth upon certain observable facts about that other person 
or what is on the wall. I will argue that the physical characteristics of a person logically 
determine the introspective beliefs that the person holds about his or her phenomenal 
experiences. That is, any two people who are identical in their physiological 
characteristics will necessarily have introspective beliefs of identical truth-conditional 
content.  
Someone might deny such a logical connection between a person’s physical 
characteristics and his or her introspective, cognitive states, holding that two people could 
differ in their introspective beliefs despite being physiologically the same. Such a person 
denies that the physical facts relevant to a person logically determine the content of the 
person’s introspective beliefs, maintaining that the character of a person’s introspective 
belief is not necessarily fixed by the physical characteristics of the person. On this 
account, it would be logically possible for two people to have all their relevant 
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physiological characteristics in common but for some of their introspective beliefs to 
differ in truth-conditional content.    
One way to argue against a logical connection between physiology and 
introspective belief content is by holding that introspective beliefs depend for their 
contents on accompanying phenomenal experiences, which are themselves physically 
irreducible. Call these irreducibly phenomenal beliefs. A belief is irreducibly phenomenal 
if it depends for its truth-condition on some non-physical features of the believer. On this 
view, there is an irreducibly phenomenal raw feel to the occurrence of an introspective 
belief, which no purely psychological or behavioural analysis can account for, and which 
the belief must have, in order to possess whatever truth-conditional content it does. If the 
content of an introspective belief depends partly on the believer’s phenomenology, and if, 
as a dualist contends, phenomenology is logically independent of physiology, then, 
contrary to (A1), a person’s physical characteristics do not determine the contents of his 
introspective beliefs.    
This is not an argument for dualism, but it shows that (A1) is at least not obvious. 
So I need to give an argument for (A1).  
My argument for (A1) is as follows:           
  
B1. If it is not true that (A1), then a private belief is possible.  
B2. If a private belief is possible, then it is possible to talk privately about one’s 
sensations.  
B3.      But it is impossible to speak privately about one’s sensations.  
B4.      So, a private belief is not possible. (B2 & B3) 
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B5.      So, it is true that (A1). (B1, B4)  
 
There are two premises to be defended in this rebuttal: B1 and B2; B3 has been argued 
earlier (chap. four, I). The stronger of the premises is B1; this is where the dualist can put 
up more resistance.  
I now discuss B1 and B2 in detail, beginning with B1.  
       
B1. If a person’s physical characteristics do not logically determine the truth-conditional 
contents of his introspective beliefs, then a logically private belief is possible. A property 
or entity, or any aspect or part thereof, is private if it cannot possibly be known to anyone 
distinct from the person who possesses it. Any non-physical property or feature is 
inaccessible in the sense that it cannot be known, to anyone other than the one who 
possesses it. Thus, an irreducibly phenomenal belief, or the irreducibly phenomenal 
aspect of an irreducibly phenomenal belief is private. It follows that if the content of a 
person’s introspective beliefs depends in part on his or her non-physical properties, their 
contents cannot possibly be known to anyone but that person.     
An objector might deny that it is logically impossible for someone to know about 
the non-physical features of another person. He might argue, for instance, that it does not 
follow from the claim that the content of a belief depends on some non-physical features 
of the believer, that the content of this belief can be known only to the believer. This 
would follow only on the assumption that only the person who has a given non-physical 
feature can know that he has it. But it is not ruled out yet that someone can know that 
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another person has a certain non-physical property by noticing certain physical effects of 
this property.  
The claim is that one can know about other people’s non-physical properties by 
focusing on those properties’ physical effects. Nonetheless, such a person is not in a 
comfortable situation. For the claim that a non-physical feature of a person can be known 
to someone else supposedly by focusing on certain physical effects of the property 
presupposes that the non-physical properties have physical, causal effects. This rules out 
epiphenomenalism, which takes non-physical properties as physically non-efficacious; it 
commits the critic to some version of dualist interactionism, which attributes causal 
powers to non-physical properties.  
Dualist interactionism says that there is a non-physical realm which exerts causal 
influence on the physical and vice-versa. It holds that some physiological events are to be 
explained only in terms of irreducibly phenomenal events; that there are non-physical 
causes that produce physical effects. The relevance of this to the present discussion is its 
connection to the critic’s explanation of how someone else can know the content of a 
belief that I have, given that the belief depends on certain non-physical properties of mine 
for its truth-conditions. That explanation requires non-physical properties to produce 
physical effects. The question is how a non-physical mental state is to have effects on a 
physical body.  
But the claim that such interaction occurs faces several objections. One objection 
is that current scientific thinking has no need to posit a non-physical cause for any 
physical event. The scientific process of prediction and explanation is causally closed.92 
                                                 
92 David Chalmers, Op. cit., p. 125; David Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.)   
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In the explanation of a physical event, there is no need for any mysterious, non-physical 
cause whose effect is nevertheless physical. The explanation of a physical event is a 
physical account of the chain of events leading directly or ultimately to that effect, and in 
light of which we can successfully predict or replicate a similar physical event. Again, 
there is no physical effect whose explanation is not ultimately connected to a physical 
cause; every physical effect ultimately has explanatory connection with a physical cause. 
This does not necessarily mean that there are no non-physical causes, just that 
observation of another person’s physical behaviour never gives one a good reason to 
posit a non-physical cause in that person.  
Moreover, it seems that any phenomenon that has physical causes and effects 
should itself be considered a physical phenomenon. Consider, for instance, Maxwell’s 
insights into electromagnetism. According to Maxwell, electromagnetism is a 
phenomenon irreducible to any other physical phenomenon – a view that has long been 
universally accepted. But no one insists that electromagnetic waves are non-physical 
properties; we simply expanded our physical ontology. This is because electromagnetic 
waves have uncontroversially physical causes and effects. In the same vein, if it happens 
that a mental phenomenon has neural causes and effects on physical behaviour, there is 
no reason not to treat such a phenomenon as physical.    
So, there is some good reason – not necessarily a compelling reason, but a good 
reason – to think that B1 is true, and very good reason to think that if it is false, that can 
only be because phenomenal experience has physical effects, meaning that the only 
possibly defensible dualism is an interactive dualism. Given the problems facing 
interactive dualism, it seems reasonable to accept B1. If interactive dualism turns out to 
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be more defensible than it appears, the conclusion of the APCP can be modified to state 
that either a person’s physical characteristics determine his phenomenology or some kind 
of interactive dualism is true.      
 
B2. If a private belief is possible, then it is possible for someone to talk privately about 
his or her sensations. The dualist’s problem is not only that denying (A1) presupposes the 
logical possibility of private beliefs, but also the theoretical possibility of talking 
privately to oneself about the private aspect of one’s beliefs. Anyone who has a belief 
must be able to express it by means of assertion, so anyone who has a private belief must 
be capable of expressing it by means of a private assertion. It would be a strange thing to 
insist that whatever one does, however one might try, certain features of one’s 
introspective beliefs that depend on one’s non-physical properties are private and 
inaccessible to anyone else; but to deny in the same breath the theoretical possibility of 
saying something to oneself in a similar mode about these non-physical properties of 
one’s introspective beliefs. It is difficult to see how there could be a belief that exists in 
the inner recesses of my mind, strictly independently of my brain processes and other 
physical characteristics, but about which I cannot say anything to myself in a private 
speech act that has no connection to those physical characteristics.  
Of course, it is not an option to object that one can talk about such private beliefs 
publicly. We can respond to this in light of what we have learned from Chapter Four, I. 
That is, the critic might claim that a person’s public utterances are effects of the non-
physical features of the person. But this is hard to believe, given that a person’s linguistic 
behaviour logically depends on the person’s physical characteristics. That is, the 
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differences between the different kinds of public speech acts that a person performs are 
grounded ultimately in the person’s non-linguistic public behaviour or dispositions to 
behave. In other words, a person’s ability to make different kinds of public speech acts is 
fixed by the person’s public nature, characteristic ways of behaving, etc. It follows that 
an introspective belief whose truth-conditional content supposedly depends in part on the 
non-physical property of the believer, but which the person can nevertheless talk about 
(i.e., in the believer’s public utterances being effects of the non-physical properties) in 
public is ultimately fixed by the person’s physical characteristics.  
Let me explain further. Suppose the utterance, ‘I feel pain,’ is a public effect of an 
irreducibly phenomenal introspective belief of mine. Apart from the assertion, ‘I feel 
pain,’ I must be able to perform other kinds of speech acts whose truth-conditions depend 
on the content of my irreducibly phenomenal introspective beliefs. And in order for my 
irreducibly phenomenal introspective beliefs to have multiple public-utterance effects on 
me (i.e., for me to perform varieties of public speech acts), I must be able to ground the 
differences between them. But the different kinds of public-speech-act-effects of my 
irreducibly phenomenal introspective beliefs must ultimately be grounded in my non-
linguistic public characteristics. If the differences in the different kinds of these public-
speech-act-effects so depend on my physical characteristics, then it is hard to tell how or 
why they are public effects of non-physical properties of mine.                  
To recap, there is a tight connection between the physical characteristics of a 
person and the content of his or her introspective beliefs. A denial of this connection, as 
in the idea of a phenomenal belief, necessarily commits one to the logical possibility of a 
private belief, and consequently of private speech acts. That is, anyone who argues that it 
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is logically possible for the contents of a person’s introspective beliefs to vary even if we 
hold constant the person’s physical characteristics is committed to the idea that a private 
language is possible.   
Premise A2. I now consider the second premise in the argument to the conclusion 
that a person’s physical characteristics logically determine his phenomenology. That is: 
The truth-conditional contents of a person’s introspective beliefs logically determine his 
phenomenology. The point here is that the possessing of the introspective belief that a 
person does necessarily entails that the person has the phenomenology that he has. Any 
two conscious beings that have identical introspective beliefs necessarily have identical 
phenomenology. Given this reading of A2, it is impossible for any one of two conscious 
beings who have introspective beliefs with identical truth contents to be mistaken about 
the phenomenal quality of his experience. It takes an error of this type for their 
phenomenal experiences to be different (even though they have identical introspective 
belief contents). In order for A2 to be true, one must also deny the possibility of any of 
two conscious beings who are identical in terms of the truth contents of their 
introspective beliefs to be ignorant of his occurrent phenomenology. Such ignorance 
would imply that they differ in their phenomenology, no matter that the truth contents of 
their introspective beliefs are identical.  
That is, an objector might resist premise (A2) of the APCP, by arguing for the 
possibility of introspective error (i.e., a mistaken introspective belief about one’s own 
occurrent phenomenology) or introspective ignorance (i.e., ignorance of one’s occurrent 
phenomenology). The only option that the person is left with – in order to deny the 
argument to the conclusion of APCP – is to argue that it is logically possible for a 
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person’s phenomenal experience to differ from how he believes it to be on the basis of 
introspection; or, that it is logically possible for the person to be ignorant of some of his 
phenomenal experience altogether.  
Against the first objection, I will defend the infallibility thesis narrowly conceived 
as the claim that we cannot have mistaken beliefs about any of phenomenal experiences 
that we are introspecting. It is impossible for a person to make a mistake about how his 
own occurrent phenomenal experience seems to him. Against the second objection, I will 
argue that I could form appropriate introspective beliefs about my occurrent phenomenal 
experience if I paid enough attention to that experience. I will consider these objections 
now.   
Let us begin with the putative possibility of introspective error. Armstrong argues 
that a person can have a false introspective belief about his occurrent phenomenal 
experience, given that phenomenal experience is a ‘distinct existence” from introspective 
belief about the experience, and that one could then have introspective belief that he is in 
pain in the absence of pain. 
The important premise in Armstrong’s argument that a person could make that 
sort of mistake about his own occurrent phenomenal experience, I believe is: ‘The act of 
introspection is a ‘distinct existence’ from the phenomenal experience it concerns or is 
directed towards.’ Introspection is thus akin to the self-scanning process of a mechanism; 
and “the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must be ‘distinct existences’.”93 
This suggests that it is logically possible for me to believe that I am in pain in the absence 
of any pain sensation. If, as Armstrong suggests, my belief that I am in pain consists of an 
                                                 




internal scanner that scans my pain state, then it seems possible for the scanner to 
malfunction by operating as if there were a pain present when really there is not. In that 
case, it would be possible for me to believe I am in pain mistakenly.94  
The question now is whether introspection is a distinct existence from 
phenomenal experience. Armstrong thinks that it must be for materialism to be true. He 
argues that a plausible account of materialism must posit a causal relation between 
introspective belief and phenomenology. But a materialist is not committed to this view. 
One may argue for instance that the mental process that determines a person’s 
phenomenal experience is the same as the mental process of introspection. It is possible 
to argue, for instance, that it takes the firing of the neurons whose firings constitutes a 
sensation of a certain quality for the person to introspect the phenomenal quality of the 
sensation. In that case, a sensation is not a distinct existence from the introspection of the 
sensation. Rather, one is the same as the other: the firings of the neurons that instantiate 
or are constitutive of my phenomenology are the same pattern of neuron firings that 
constitute my occurrent introspective belief. We might suppose that a person’s 
phenomenal experience of pain or red consists of the firings of certain neurons, say, A, B, 
C, D and E, and that the person’s occurrent belief about the quality of the sensation is 
instantiated by the firings of neurons A, B, C, D, and E. In this case, the ‘mechanism’ of 
consciousness is such that a person’s occurrent phenomenal experience PE is the same as 
his or her occurrent belief OB about PE; PE is identical with OB. 
 Apart from Armstrong’s principled objection to the claim that we are infallible in 
our judgements about our own occurrent phenomenology, there are a number of putative 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 104-07.  
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counter-examples to the infallibility thesis. Someone, for instance, might agree that one 
cannot be mistaken whether one is having a pain or what it is like, but still claim that one 
can be mistaken whether the excitement that one feels now is fear or exhilaration. But 
this problem can be understood as uncertainty over which word to apply to the 
experience, or, how the experience compares to others one has had in the past. It might 
also be objected that people who have a leg amputated often report a pain in the missing 
leg. This is perhaps so; but it is not a mistake about the phenomenal quality of the pain.  
Consider a prisoner who is subjected to bouts of torture. On each of the episodes, 
he believes that his sensation is painful. We can assume that his introspective belief 
correlates with his phenomenal experience, i.e., that it is painful. After a lengthy session 
of torture, his captors give him a different kind of treatment, say, a soothing one. There is 
a chance that the prisoner might scream or report that he is in pain, thereby believing in 
error that he is in pain, however momentarily. If so, it follows that the person is mistaken 
about his occurrent phenomenology.    
Whatever else this thought-experiment might say about the psychological state of 
the prisoner, it is doubtful that it impugns the infallibility of introspective belief. It 
probably follows from the experiment that the prisoner is confused about the physical, 
external, stimulus that precipitates his occurrent phenomenology. Such confusion might 
not be totally unexpected, considering his suffering. But it is irrelevant to the infallibility 
thesis what the actual stimulus of a person’s phenomenal experience is; so a mistake 
about the stimulus of one’s conscious experience is not to the point. What is to the point 
here is whether the person makes a mistake about the phenomenal quality of his occurrent 
conscious experience. Even if one grants that the person screams about his occurrent 
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experience or believes that he is in pain, one is not necessarily committed to the view that 
he is mistaken about his belief. For it is open to the proponent of infallibility thesis to 
argue that the prisoner’s introspective belief is consistent with his phenomenal 
experience. It may be that the treatment he receives causes him pain, due to its 
occurrence in the context of a session of torture, even though in normal contexts it would 
not cause him pain. Alternatively, it may be that the prisoner momentarily acts as if he 
believes he is in pain without really believing it. He might even mistakenly believe that 
he believes he is in pain—a mistake that would be consistent with the infallibility thesis. 
What the opponent needs to show is a compelling reason for us to rule out these 
possibilities. This, the experiment has yet to do; it has not shown that the prisoner’s 
phenomenal experience is different from how he believes it to be.95    
Now let us consider the putative possibility of introspective ignorance. Another 
possible objection to A2 is that a person can have conscious experience of a certain 
phenomenal quality without believing that he has that experience. The proponent of 
introspective ignorance argues that it is logically possible that a person is in a 
phenomenal state, but is not aware that he is in that phenomenal state. Thus, one could, 
for instance, be having a pain, without being aware that one is having it. But how can that 
be? One might respond: ‘If a person is not aware of the quality of his own experience, 
then it cannot count as a phenomenal experience.’ Against this, Armstrong once more 
appeals to the controversial idea of “distinct existences.” If, for example, pains and 
                                                 
95 It is possible to treat “blindness denial” counterexample, in which a conscious being believes that he or 
she is having a conscious experience of colour when it is almost certainly impossible that the person is not, 
in a similar way. See David Chalmers, op. cit., 260-1.  
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introspective beliefs are distinct brain-processes, then it must be possible for the pains to 
exist in the absence of the introspective beliefs.   
But the question again is why we should subscribe to the idea of “distinct 
existences”. A materialist, as I have argued earlier, can suppose that the neural firings 
that constitute a given conscious experience are integral parts of the pattern of neuron 
firings that constitute the corresponding introspective belief. That way we do not 
necessarily have to think of the pain and the introspective belief that it occurs as distinct 
existences.  
Proponents of the idea that it is possible to be ignorant about one’s own occurrent 
conscious experience might insist that it is logically possible, anyway, for someone to 
have a conscious experience but not have an introspective belief about it. The person 
might argue, for instance, that it is possible for one’s introspective beliefs about a 
phenomenal experience to leave out certain features of the experience. Consider, for 
instance, the case of driving along a monotonous highway while daydreaming. Suppose I 
suddenly realise, upon arriving at my destination, that I cannot remember much of my 
driving experience. I cannot remember having formed any introspective beliefs relevant 
to my journey, yet I am able to arrive at a predetermined location. The critic might argue 
that I must have been having conscious experiences while driving but nevertheless I am 
ignorant of them.  
Of course, one might insist that one has no such conscious experiences in the first 
place; that if one does there is no chance that one will be cognitively distant from them. 
But it seems there is something to the critic’s complaint. The fact that I arrived safely at 
my destination is probably a relevant point. This may force us to give some ground but it 
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does not necessarily diminish the merit of the infallibility of introspective belief. All the 
experiment shows is that I have no ‘immediate’ awareness of my phenomenal experience; 
but not that I cannot possibly have it. Presumably, if I paid enough attention to my 
conscious experience, or refocused on it, I could form the appropriate introspective belief 
about those experiences. To be sure, for “omniscience”, I do not require that a person has 
“active” or “occurrent” beliefs about his own phenomenology, but perhaps only “passive” 
or “dispositional” beliefs.  
We can therefore redefine ‘introspective beliefs’ to include both actual 
introspective beliefs and potential introspective beliefs. That is, any conscious experience 
that I have is one about which I have an actual introspective belief or a potential 
introspective belief where a potential introspective belief that p is just one that I would 
have if I asked myself whether it was the case that p. This is a concession we can afford 
to make, since a person’s potential introspective beliefs are no less determined by his 
public, physical characteristics than his actual introspective beliefs. But it could not be 
the case, as the opponent of this claim would want us believe, that I could have a 
supposedly conscious experience about which I could not possibly have a relevant 




From the foregoing discussion, it makes sense to conclude that the physical 
characteristics of a person logically determine his phenomenal characteristics. Anyone 
who thinks otherwise will have to deny either or both the APCP premises. Denying A1 
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commits one to the idea of an introspective belief whose truth-conditions are logically 
independent of the believer’s physical characteristics, i.e., a private belief. This in turn 
implies the possibility of a private language. But a private language, as Wittgenstein 
argues, is logically impossible. There may be some room for manoeuvre here by appeal 
to an interactive dualism, but we have found reason to be sceptical about interactive 
dualism. Anyway, if the only way around the APCP is through interactionism, that in 
itself is an interesting and important result.   
For A2, the opponent presupposes the logical possibility of error or ignorance 
about the phenomenal quality of one’s own conscious experience. It is not enough for the 
person to simply say that one could conceive of no contradiction in supposing that a 
person might misidentify his or her occurrent phenomenology. An objector will have to 
describe a counterexample. But it is difficult to see what situation might be rightly 
described as a scenario where I believe that my phenomenology is this way, though it 
seems to me some other way. Similarly, the person’s argument for phenomenal ignorance 
is not forceful. We can always meet that objection by defining introspective beliefs to 
cover both the actual and the potential ones.   
In the next two parts of this chapter, I provide some evidence that suggests that 
Wittgenstein is aware of, and interested in, the debate concerning the nature of 
consciousness, and that he defends a particular view of that nature. In the following part, 
I discuss some of his remarks that bear on the mind/body problem. In part III, I flesh out 
a more recognisably Wittgensteinian argument for the physical nature of phenomenology 
than the one presented above.   
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II. Evidence of Wittgenstein’s Awareness of and Interest in the Mind/Body Debate  
 
What evidence is there to suggest that Wittgenstein might be interested in the mind/body 
problem, as it is presently understood? Perhaps there can be no better evidence than his 
remarks in the preface to the Philosophical Investigations. There he states that:  
 
The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical 
investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern 
many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of 
logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. 
(PI, preface, ix) 
 
Here Wittgenstein states unequivocally that he intends the Philosophical Investigations as 
a kind of anthology of his philosophical thoughts, including his thoughts on the nature of 
consciousness. My task is to unearth what these thoughts are.  
 At (PI §420), Wittgenstein poses the following question: “But can’t I imagine that 
the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the 
same way as usual?” He goes on to deny the possibility of automata. This denial aside, 
the point here is that Wittgenstein’s question is akin to that of the possibility of a zombie 
in the contemporary mind/body literature. The zombie argument tries to establish the 
logical possibility of a being that is physically like me but who does not have any 
phenomenal experience whatsoever. It posits that two individuals can have all their 
physical characteristics in common, even if one has qualitative experiences and the other 
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is phenomenally blank. When the one burns his finger or loses a tooth, he hurts, feels 
pain. The other goes into an identical physical state as the one when he ‘hurts’ himself 
but he feels no pain. Most contemporary versions of dualism hold that such a being is 
logically possible. Wittgenstein apparently denies it. In any case, the fact that he as much 
as discusses the possibility of a zombie shows that he conceives of the mind/body 
problem in a way quite similar to the way it is conceived of by contemporary 
philosophers of mind.96   
 Again, at (PI §272), Wittgenstein’s declares,  
 
The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person 
possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also 
have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though 
unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another 
section another.  
 
This also shows clearly that Wittgenstein is interested in the phenomenology of 
sensation. This interest is different from the aspect of the study of the mind which focuses 
on the explanation of behaviour. Wittgenstein uses sensation (of red) to refer to conscious 
experience. And as it is common in contemporary literature, he uses words like ‘red’, 
‘pain’, and suchlike to discuss his concern about the nature of phenomenology. PI §272, 
for instance, establishes Wittgenstein’s concern not only about conscious experience, but 
also about dualism. For, the remark is a clear case of the ‘inverted spectrum/qualia’ 
                                                 
96 See David Chalmers, “The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory” op. cit.; Robert Kirk, 
Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).   
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argument. And, if “one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section 
another”, i.e., if spectrum inversion between physical duplicates is (logically) possible, 
then a version of dualism would follow. Given that the difference could exist without any 
physical basis, which, I take it, is what Wittgenstein is getting at by calling the supposed 
difference “unverifiable,” it must be a difference in non-physical qualities.     
Wittgenstein rejects this view in the subsequent remarks, but I am not concerned 
about his argument here. What I consider striking, and of immediate importance, is the 
method of his objection. At (PI §273), he quickly redefines the concern about the 
supposed inversion of the sensation of red in a section of mankind relative to another in 
terms of the language of sensation, 
 
What am I to say about the word “red”?—that it means something ‘confronting us 
all’ and that everyone should really have another word, besides this one, to mean 
his own sensation of red? Or is it like this: the word “red” means something 
known to everyone; and in addition, for each person, it means something known 
only to him? (Or perhaps rather: it refers to something known only to him.) 
 
Here the problem of different sections of humanity having different sensations of red is 
correlated with the question of individuals using the word “red” to refer to their 
(individual) sensations of red, and another word for the common sensation, or of using 
the same word for both kinds of sensation altogether. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the question 
of the inversion of colour-sensation is closely related to the question of the possibility of 
using a common word publicly – to refer to something “confronting us all” – and at the 
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same time privately – to refer to something ‘confronting’ each person. The moral here is 
that if the suggested implication holds, i.e., if the logical possibility of inverted spectrum 
implies the logical possibility of using a word privately to refer to one’s own sensations, 
then the impossibility of a private use of a word will imply the impossibility of 
phenomenal spectrum inversion.         
Elsewhere, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between experiences that exhibit 
phenomenal consciousness and other kinds of mental entities that do not have 
phenomenal properties. At (RPP vol. II, §45), he writes: 
 
I want to talk about a ‘state of consciousness’, and to use this expression to refer 
to the seeing of a certain picture, the hearing of a tone, a sensation of pain or of 
taste, etc. I want to say that believing, understanding, knowing, intending, and 
others, are not states of consciousness. If for the moment I call these latter 
‘dispositions’, then an important difference between dispositions and states of 
consciousness consists in the fact that a disposition is not interrupted by a break in 
consciousness or a shift in attention.97   
 
Two points are clear here. The first point is that Wittgenstein recognizes the aspect of 
consciousness which is of greater concern in the philosophy of the mind—the 
phenomenal aspect. Second, he specifies a possible way of differentiating this aspect of 
the mind from what has come to be known as the psychological aspect, in contemporary 
jargon. ‘Dispositions’, he says, are not constrained by one’s paying attention to the 
                                                 
97 Cited by Colin McGinn, ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning’, op. cit., 94.   
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relevant state. Believing, for instance, does not require that I pay attention to or focus on 
my belief, say, that p in order to continue to believe that p. That is, my belief that p need 
not be interrupted by a ‘shift’ in my attention. As Wittgenstein insists in the same remark: 
“An interruption of belief would be a period of unbelief”; to say of me then that my belief 
that p is interrupted would mean that p does not count as a belief for me for that period. 
But I do not stop believing that p simply because I shift my focus away from p. Thus, 
beliefs are not states of (phenomenal) consciousness.  
But it is a different matter with ‘states of consciousness’. The persistence of a 
phenomenal experience, say, pain, seems to depend strictly on one’s ability to continue to 
concentrate on it. In other words, a person’s conscious experience of pain can be 
interrupted by a shift in the person’s attention. It seems to follow, at least, that persistent 
belief or any other form of cognition does not depend on one’s continuous attention as 
does the persistent feel of pain.98 Moreover, in holding that a “state of consciousness” can 
exist only as long as one’s attention is focused on what one is conscious of, Wittgenstein 
seems to commit himself to the view that one is necessarily aware of one’s own occurrent 
states of consciousness. That is, he rejects the possibility of phenomenal ignorance.  
Further evidence that Wittgenstein was interested in the mind/body problem as it 
is presently understood comes from his intimate acquaintance with Russell’s work. It is 
not difficult to see how some of Russell’s remarks, if true, might validate some important 
dualist thesis that, on my reading, the private language argument ultimately sets out to 
repudiate. In this respect, some other remarks are perhaps more telling. In the Philosophy 
                                                 
98 Cf. McGinn’s discussion of this remark, ibid., 94 – 5.   
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of Logical Atomism, Russell delivers what is arguably the precursor to the knowledge 
argument against physicalism: 
 
If you take such a proposition as ‘This is red’ and substitute for it ‘This has the 
colour with the greatest wave-length’, you have a different proposition altogether. 
You can see that at once, because a person who knows nothing of the physical 
theory of colour can understand the proposition ‘This is red’, and can know that it 
is true, but cannot know that ‘This has the colour which has the greatest wave-
length’. Conversely, you might have a hypothetical person who could not see red, 
but who understood the physical theory of colour and could apprehend the 
proposition ‘This has the colour with the greatest wave-length’, but who would 
not be able to understand the proposition ‘This is red’ as understood by the 
normal uneducated person.99  
 
Here Russell delivers, though in a crude form, what is probably the earliest version of the 
‘knowledge argument’ against physicalism, as it is known in the contemporary 
mind/body debate. This I think shows that Wittgenstein was familiar with the problem of 
consciousness even as it is presently understood.     
 In the next section, I argue that Wittgenstein is friendly with the view that 
phenomenology is physical, even if he would not put it that way.    
 
 
                                                 
99 Bertrand Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism, edited & introduced by David Pears (La Salle: Open 
Court, 1985) p. 55.  
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III. Justification for Attributing the APCP to Wittgenstein 
 
The goal in this section is to provide evidence of Wittgenstein’s support for the physical 
nature of phenomenology. But in doing this, I do not intend to squeeze the APCP out of 
Wittgenstein’s texts. Instead, I present different passages which I think make it plausible 
that something like the APCP is not totally foreign to his thinking. Given the album-like 
character of Wittgenstein’s writing, this is probably the most we can realistically hope 
for.   
First, let us recall the APCP: 
 
A1.  A person’s physical characteristics logically determine the truth-conditional 
contents of his introspective beliefs, including the beliefs he holds about his own 
sensations. 
 
A2.  The truth-conditional contents of a person’s introspective beliefs logically 
determine his phenomenology. 
 
A3.  Therefore, a person’s physical characteristics logically determine his 
phenomenology. (A1 & A2)  
 
The central idea in A1, you will recall, is that there could not possibly be a difference in a 
person’s introspective beliefs without a corresponding difference in the person’s 
physiological characteristics. In A2, the point is that there could not possibly be a 
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difference in the quality of a person’s phenomenal consciousness without a 
corresponding difference in the status of the person’s introspective beliefs. Recall that 
some of Wittgenstein’s terms are different from their contemporary counterparts with 
which they share meanings. In order to make the following discussion more readily 
identifiable with Wittgenstein, I use words like ‘states of consciousness’, ‘sensations’, 
‘inner experiences,’ where a contemporary philosopher of mind might use phrases like 
‘phenomenal quality of experiences’, ‘phenomenal consciousness,’ and suchlike. And I 
use ‘public’ or ‘physiological characteristics’ instead of ‘physical’ or ‘physical 
characteristics.’     
 
Remarks in support of A2 
 
At (PI §288), Wittgenstein poses the following question: “I turn to stone and my pain 
goes on. Suppose I were in error and it was no longer pain?” The question is: could I 
possibly be mistaken about the sensation I have now? That is, could I possibly believe 
that a sensation I have now is painful to me when it actually is not painful to me? His 
immediate response is no. But Wittgenstein is more precise: where there is no possibility 
of error, a doubt cannot exist. It makes no sense; it means nothing to have doubts about 
the sensation I have now. Thus, he asserts: “But I can’t be in error here; it means nothing 
to doubt whether I am in pain!” As he might put it, this question is apparently not about 
the nature of the inner experience of pain, but rather about the word “pain”. It is a 
question posed by someone who is not familiar with the English word “pain.” Naturally, 
‘if anyone said “I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something else”, we should 
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think something like, he does not know what the English word “pain” means; and we 
should explain it to him.” Cf. (PI §381)      
But could someone who truly understands the word “pain” seriously raise the 
question of whether he is in pain? Again, no! Wittgenstein continues at (PI §288), if the 
person rejoins: ‘“Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what I don’t know is whether this, that I 
have now, is pain”—we should merely shake our heads and be forced to regard his words 
as a queer reaction which we have no idea what to do with.’   
Wittgenstein’s point at (PI §288ff) can be made quickly. Given that one truly 
understands the word ‘pain’, it is not possible – it means nothing, makes no sense, it is 
empty – for one to doubt that one is having a pain-sensation while one is having that 
sensation. The language-game we play with ‘pain’ (sensation-words) precludes the 
question whether this sensation seems to me painful or not while it seems to me painful. 
It seems, therefore, that Wittgenstein holds that there is really no difference between my 
being in pain and my believing I am in pain. This shows that he rules out not only the 
possibility of phenomenal ignorance, but of introspective error as well.   
  
Remarks in support of A1 
 
Consider the beetle in the box thought-experiment at (PI §293). Wittgenstein asks us to 
imagine that everyone has a box in which he claims to have a “beetle.” But no one can 
look into another person’s box. So, whatever the word “beetle” refers to, each person 
says he knows what it is only by looking into his own box. According to Wittgenstein, it 
would not only be possible that everyone has something different in his box, but also that 
 129
what he has might change constantly. But if we imagine that the people have a shared 
language, and the word a use in it, then this problem would not arise since they would not 
be naming a ‘thing’; the word would have a place for it in their language game. That is, 
the word would not be the name of the “beetle” in my box but the use for which the thing 
has in day-to-day activities. Even if the box is empty, as it might be the case, the word 
can still have a use in the people’s language game.  
The point of the beetle-box experiment is as follows:  
 
If (1) the contents of your box (your beetle) are private (epistemically inaccessible to 
third parties), and, (2) your assertions about the contents of your box depend for their 
truth-conditions on some private aspect of the box’s contents, then, (3) your assertions 
about the contents of your box are meaningless (empty, lacking in definite truth-
conditions).  
 The intended analogy is this: replace “contents of your box” with “contents of 
your consciousness” or “occurrent sensations”; replace “private” (epistemically 
inaccessible to third parties) with “non-physical”; replace “assertions about the contents 
of your box” with “introspective beliefs about your sensations”. Then the claim becomes: 
 
If (1) the contents of your consciousness – your sensations – are non-physical, and, (2) 
your introspective beliefs about your sensations depend for their truth-conditions on some 
non-physical aspect of these sensations, then, (3) your introspective beliefs about your 
sensation lack definite truth-conditions.    
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So suppose this is right, and Wittgenstein holds (1), (2) & (3), the path to A1 is now 
clear. For,  
 
(4) Your introspective beliefs about your sensations do have definite truth-
conditions.  
 
So, either (1) or (2) must be false. Obviously a dualist cannot deny (1), so, he must 
deny (2). That is, he must say that the contents of your introspective beliefs do not 
depend on any non-physical aspect of your sensations. But then what do your 
introspective beliefs depend on for their truth-conditions? Presumably just on some of 
your physical features – some physical aspect of yourself. But that is precisely what A1 
says.  
 So, interpreted this way, PI §293 supports attributing A1 to Wittgenstein.  
 
To recap, it is evident that Wittgenstein does not advance a well-defined, clearly 
regimented argument of the type I offer in part I of this chapter; but loose remarks that 
are offered as landmarks to his philosophical thought. I try to knit these remarks together 
as closely and as clearly as possible. Perhaps if Wittgenstein had had more time, his 
remarks would have evolved into a seamless chain of reasoning. In any event, I hope I 
have shown with this effort that there is at least some room to attribute the APCP to 




IV: Some Alternative Interpretations of the importance of the Impossibility of a 
Private Language 
 
Apart from its connection to the nature of consciousness which this thesis emphasises, the 
impossibility of a private language is also believed to connect to varying philosophical 
problems. Quite a few scholars hold the view that the impossibility of a private language 
impacts an array of problems in philosophy. Kenny, for instance, holds that the 
impossibility of a private language ‘has […] consequences for epistemology and 
philosophy of mind.’ Hacker also contends that it attacks the sources of certain 
‘intellectual diseases’ such as idealism and solipsism. He says: “Its global target is a 
misconstrual of our concepts of experience, of the nature of the mental and its relation to 
behaviour, that is pervasive in philosophy.” Such misinterpretations, Hacker maintains, 
“inform philosophical, psychological and theoretical linguistic accounts of the nature of 
language, of the foundations of language in ‘private’ experience and ‘private’ rules […], 
and of the putative foundations of knowledge.”100  
 
IV.1  A possible connection with the nature of consciousness  
 
McGinn believes that Wittgenstein’s goal in the private language argument is to reveal 
something about the nature of consciousness. His interpretation of ‘privately’ is 
                                                 
100 See Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, op. cit., 142. For Hacker’s view, see P. M. S. Hacker (and Baker) 
“Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind,” op. cit., 19, cf. 14; cf. P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Connections and 
Controversies, op. cit., 309.  For a possible connection of the impossibility of a private language to a ‘use 
theory of meaning’, see Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication, A. Akmajian, et. 
al., cited by David Stern, “A New Exposition of the ‘Private Language Argument’,” op. cit., 558.   
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instrumental to this connection. He argues that by ‘privately’ Wittgenstein means: 
“‘within the sphere of consciousness in logical independence of behaviour’.” This 
interpretation of ‘privacy’ seems consistent with mine. But this probably runs no deeper 
than the surface. For, in the first instance, McGinn maps out the impossibility of a private 
language on the (alternative) reading that the task of a putative private linguist is to 
develop a language that is distinct from a public language. His interpretation of the PLA 
is also open to other defects which have to do with ‘verificationism’ and ‘fallibility of 
memory’. One is the claim that a consistent use of the private linguist’s words to refer to 
his sensations depends on the presence of properties that are publicly accessible both to 
the linguist himself and to his hearer. That being so, the private linguist can only appeal 
to his memory, which, by itself, raises the other problem of the person’s memory to 
provide the requisite evidence of constancy. Wittgenstein’s PLA, as I read it, steers clear 
of these defects. (Cf. ‘the individual or anti-community view,’ Chap. Four, I.2.A.ii).      
 A more significant difference between my reading of Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument and McGinn’s reading is the view of the nature of consciousness we 
attribute to Wittgenstein. My reading entails that Wittgenstein supports a version of 
physicalism, whereas McGGins’s reading entails that Wittgenstein rejects any version of 
physicalism. Now it is not immediately clear whether and how attributing such view to 
Wittgenstein draws directly on the impossibility of a private language. Nevertheless, 
McGinn’s claim supposedly follows from a certain “negative thesis” he reads 
Wittgenstein to defend. As such, even if the said claim only has indirect connection to the 
impossibility of a private language, it is nonetheless worth noting.  
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 On McGinn’s reading, certain theses are important to Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
meaning, understanding and other psychological concepts. In order to bring to fore 
Wittgenstein’s supposed denial of some form of physicalism, I discuss one of these 
theses, which is: “To mean something by a sign is not to be the subject of an inner state 
or process.” Here (i) Wittgenstein is correctly read to reject the view that meaning or 
understanding something necessarily consists in having its mental image before one’s 
own mind. This is a “rejection of the idea that meaning [or understanding] something 
consists in certain conscious or experiential states and processes.” Admittedly, certain 
experiential states do accompany understanding and meaning but they do not in 
themselves constitute meaning or understanding.101 According to McGinn, what 
Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing a distinction between ‘occurrent’ and 
‘dispositional’ concepts in order to reject the assimilation of psychological concepts, not 
only the conception of understanding and meaning, but also calculating, believing, and 
suchlike to states of consciousness.102   
 (ii) Also, Wittgenstein is read to reject “the idea that meaning or understanding is 
a state or process of one’s ‘mental apparatus’, i.e., of the nervous system or some other 
kind of subconscious mechanism.” According to McGinn, Wittgenstein denies that there 
is a physical state of the nervous system or an unconscious, non-physical state of which 
psychological states are a function. The explanation goes further that a person’s states of 
understanding and believing cannot be read off the person’s brain states or processes. 
That is, he says: “The claim Wittgenstein here wishes to reject is that the difference 
                                                 
101 Colin McGinn, ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning,’ op. cit., 3-4.  
 
102 Ibid., 5, 10.  
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between one who understands and one who does not understand consists in their being in 
different unconscious or [internal] physical states.” [Added word, by me] cf. Z §§608-
10103 
 Of particular concern here is Wittgenstein’s view in (ii), as McGinn puts it, that 
one could not ‘conceive of psychological concepts in terms of [internal] physical states’, 
i.e., states of the brain and the nervous system. Wittgenstein argues, for instance, at (Z 
§609): “It is perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be 
investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them.” This 
view, according to McGinn, pre-empts a materialist who “might argue that understanding 
must be a state of mind that is the (causal) source of use because understanding is a state 
of the brain and brain states causally explain behaviour”.104 As McGinn notes, the view 
that there could be a psychological state which no internal state of nervous system 
corresponds to “has some unpalatable consequences for anyone of even moderately 
physicalist tendency.”105   
However, it seems to me that Wittgenstein here is not necessarily denying a 
‘physical’ basis for believing, understanding and other psychological states. What he 
denies is an internal physical nervous state as a basis for such psychological states. It is 
within the scope of his view that psychological states necessarily depend on the 
characteristic way of behaving of the possessor of the states or the person’s disposition to 
so behave. The question now is why a physicalist, not just a moderate one, cannot expand 
the construct of his physicalism to accommodate such physical events. In any event, it 
                                                 
103 Ibid., 10. Ref. in Zettel is cited by McGinn.   
 
104 Ibid., 112.  
 
105 Ibid., 113.  
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seems clear that what is denied is not necessarily physicalism, but a particular version of 
it.  
 Next, I discuss an interpretation that connects the impossibility of a private 
language to concerns other than the nature of consciousness, i.e., connection to the 
Cartesian tradition.   
 
IV.2  Connection to a Cartesian thesis  
 
One of the most pervasive views on why it matters whether a private language is possible 
is its connection to a certain Cartesian tradition. Moser reads Hacker – Insight and 
Illusion (1986) – to argue that “the PLA opposes the view, suggested by Descartes, 
Locke, Russell, and others, that primitive empirical terms of a language can derive their 
meanings from one’s private experiences.” On such a view, according to Moser: “[A] 
term such as ‘pain’ or ‘red’ can derive its meaning for one via one’s mental focusing on 
certain contents of one’s private experience: contents such as pain or redness, and 
suchlike.”106 On the same reading, Hacker maintains that this tradition does not merely 
project a possible way in which words referring to public objects, or public words, can 
derive their meanings; it prescribes how meaning, strictly speaking, is possible. It 
“assumes that the foundations of empirical language ‘lie not in action, not in the 
techniques of rule-application in overt linguistic activities, but in naming one’s own 
                                                 
106 Paul K. Moser: ‘Beyond the Private language Argument.’ Metaphilosophy: 23; 1&2, p.77.   
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sense-impressions (ideas, sense-data) and then using those names to describe how things 
are, first with oneself, then in the world’.”107    
On this view, Wittgenstein’s interest in private language is motivated by a desire 
to repudiate this notion of naming. This is connected with the idea that Wittgenstein 
intends to use the private language argument to criticize some of the views held by 
Russell. So it might be useful to focus closely on some of those views. Russell claims, for 
instance, that:  
A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would not only be 
intolerably prolix, but, as regards its vocabulary, would be very largely private to 
one speaker. That is to say, all the names that it would use would be private to 
that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker. It could not 
use proper names for Socrates or Piccadilly or Rumania for the reason I went into 
earlier in the lecture [that all of these things are complex, not simple, and 
therefore in need of analysis into their constituent part].  Altogether you would 
find that it would be a very inconvenient language indeed. 108 
 
The point Russell stresses is that a logically perfect language would have to comprise 
simple propositions about objects of the speaker’s direct awareness, i.e., propositions 
about sense experience or sense data and propositions about relations or universals. On 
that account, Russell concludes “all the names that it would use would be private to that 
speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker.”  
                                                 
107 Quoted by Moser, ibid. Cf. P. M. S. Hacker, “Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind,” op. cit., 15-6; Cf. also 
Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, 142.   
  
108 Cited by Ray Monk: 2005, How to Read Wittgenstein. London: Granta Books, p.89.  
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It is not immediately clear what to make of the referents of the names in Russell’s 
“logically perfect language.”  No doubt, sense-data or immediate objects of awareness are 
essential to his theory, but it seems that treating them as logically private is not. And if it 
is not a necessary part of his theory that sense-data are private, it is strange that 
Wittgenstein would focus on it, if his goal really is to show that Russell is wrong. Monk 
expresses a similar reservation, albeit for a different reason. He says,  
 
It is hard to believe, however, that the target of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the 
section 243-315 is the fairly small one of Russell’s deeply idiosyncratic views 
about the nature of a logically perfect language. It would be uncharacteristic of 
Wittgenstein, indeed it would run counter to his entire conception of what he was 
up to in his later work, for him to engage at such length in an argument against 











                                                 
109 Ray Monk, ibid., 91.  
 138
 Chapter Six     
 Conclusion  
 
The position defended in this thesis, I think, is a modest one. I offer an alternative reading 
of the private language argument, which has certain advantages over other existing 
interpretations. First, the thesis took a broad view of the private language question. This 
was not only by debating the prior question of the nature of a hypothetical private 
language, but also by spelling out in detail the implication of the impossibility of using 
such a language. Second, taking a closer look at the interpretation of the private language 
question itself, i.e., the question of the impossibility of a private language, the thesis 
made a distinction between two possible readings of that question—the impossibility of 
setting up a private language and that of using (a logically hidden language) it. By 
defending the latter reading, the thesis avoided the thorny issue that the former was 
susceptible to, which is to explain why the impossibility of a private language is 
necessarily tied to the problem of setting it up. It seems logically possible that someone 
could be born with a private language just as it is possible to imagine a person being born 
with a fully developed public language. That being so, the real question then is whether 
the person can use it in such a way that no one distinct from him can possibly know that 
it exists. 
The thesis does not claim to show that this is the correct interpretation of the 
private language argument; it does not claim to prove wrong any of the competing 
interpretations of the private language argument. The goal throughout has been to offer 
an interpretation that does at least as well as others at squaring with Wittgenstein’s texts, 
 139
and that allows us to see Wittgenstein as contributing an original and powerful argument 
that is germane to mainstream philosophical debate. 
In Chapter Two, I discussed the question of the nature of a private language. 
There, I argued that a private language is a language only its speaker can possibly know 
to exist -- that a private language is necessarily hidden from all but its speaker. This 
argument involved three main steps.  
First, I argued that a private language is either a language only its speaker can 
know to exist, or the only language its speaker can possibly have. This disjunctive claim, 
as I argued, is borne out by the fact that (B) possession of a language, L, that only the 
possessor can possibly understand is logically incompatible with the following pair of 
claims: (A) the speaker of L possesses a public language, and, (C) someone other than the 
speaker of L could have public evidence that L gets used.  
Second, I considered a seemingly strong objection to the clam that (A & C) is 
incompatible with (B). This is that (A & C) implies that a person distinct from the 
speaker of L could know something about the words of L, but not the most important and 
interesting aspect of those words, namely, the phenomenal features of the sensations that 
the words refer to. The point of this objection was that merely being able to pick out the 
referent of a sensation-word by means of a public event relevant to the speaker seems not 
enough for grasping the full meaning of the sensation word. In order to meet this 
objection, I examined more closely the nature of the sensations that the words of L 
supposedly refer to. Two relevant possibilities concerning the nature of a private 
linguist’s sensations were identified and discussed. The first was that the private 
linguist’s sensations are of a kind other people have, or at least could have. The second is 
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that the private linguist’s sensations are of a kind only he could possibly have. Against 
the first possibility, I argued that it is possible for a sensation of a kind that more than one 
person could have to acquire a public name, since it is then logically possible for the 
various members of a linguistic community to have sensations of that kind (just as the 
members of the English-speaking community all have pain sensations). Against the other 
putative possibility, I argued that this was not really a possibility at all – that a kind of 
sensation that only one person could possibly have is not possible. For, any kind of 
sensation that one can possibly think of is a kind of sensation that two or more people 
could have, at least in theory.                 
The last part of Chapter Two argued that one cannot coherently maintain that the 
speaker of a private language could not possibly speak a public language. This yielded 
the overall conclusion of the chapter, which was that a private language is by nature 
hidden, such that no one but its speaker could possibly know that it existed.  
In Chapter Three, the thesis engaged some scholars on exegetical issues. In order 
to give the conclusion reached in Chapter Two stronger textual basis, some relevant 
passages from Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations were discussed. 
Chapter Four focused on the interpretation of the private language argument. The 
chapter discussed the question: “What is it that Wittgenstein reduces to absurdity in the 
private language argument?” In light of Chapter Two, I interpreted the private language 
argument as an argument against the possibility of a (logically) hidden language. The 
crux of the private language argument, as I interpret it, is that a hidden language lacks the 
connections with non-linguistic, non-cognitive behaviour that are necessary for the 
capacity to perform a variety of speech acts, where one logically must have this capacity 
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in order to speak of one’s own sensations. I have argued, in agreement with Wittgenstein, 
that a private language is impossible.  
Two alternative interpretations were considered. According to the first, the gist of 
the private language argument was that if it is possible to talk about a private language at 
all, then the language does not exist. The crux of this interpretation is that possession of a 
private language is inconsistent with possession of a public language. But this, as I 
argued earlier in Chapter Two, is false. It is logically possible for a private linguist to 
possess a public language, as long as it is impossible for anyone besides the private 
linguist to know that the private language exists.  
According to the second alternative interpretation of the private language 
argument, the argument is that one cannot have a private language unless he invents it, 
but one cannot invent a private language, and therefore, a private language is impossible. 
This interpretation reduces the question of whether a private language is possible to the 
question whether it is possible to invent one. But it is unclear why the possibility of 
inventing a private language is essential to the consideration of the possibility of that 
language. Why can we not imagine a being popping into existence with a fully developed 
private language, given that we can, apparently, conceive of a being popping into 
existence with full command of a public language? 
In Chapter Five, we were concerned with the implications of the impossibility of a 
private language. The position of this thesis is that the impossibility of using a language 
in private weighs in favour of a physicalist philosophy of mind. At a minimum, I argued, 
the impossibility of a private language entails that conscious mental states have physical 
effects. This puts serious constraints on any dualist philosophy of mind; for example, it 
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rules out epiphenomenalism. In this chapter, I also provided some evidence that 
Wittgenstein was aware of, and interested in, the mind/body debate, and that his 
conception of the nature of consciousness is totally not foreign to mainstream and 
contemporary philosophical thought. The chapter ended with consideration of some 
alternative interpretations of what follows from the impossibility of a private language.      
There are concerns in some quarters about connecting Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophical work to any positive thesis. Such concerns read Wittgenstein’s approach to 
the discipline of philosophy and to the understanding of how its problems can be solved 
as largely therapeutic. Wittgenstein himself asserts that the difficulty of philosophy is not 
a difficulty of the intellect but of a change of attitude. (cf. PI §§119, 133, 255; PO 161) 
My approach has been to take these pronouncements with a grain of salt, without merely 
dismissing them. I have portrayed Wittgenstein as issuing reminders at strategic points of 
his argument – for example, the reminder that we do actually take ourselves to know 
something about one another’s sensations. At the same time, I have not hesitated to 
attribute positive theses to Wittgenstein, if by a “positive thesis” is meant a claim or 
assertion. Given the difficulty of Wittgenstein’s texts and of the issues with which they 
engage, it seems best to judge any interpretation of the private language argument in 
terms of both its cohesion with Wittgenstein’s words, and the independent philosophical 
interest of the argument so interpreted. I hope to have provided in this thesis an 
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